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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1565

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CONTENTS

Motor Vehicle Operators: Legal Violations
(V. Gushchin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 5 Jul 80)..... 1

Airborne Troops: Tactical Training Described
(Various sources, various dates)..... 4

Raiding Actions in Enemy Rear, by K. Kurochkin
Airborne Troops: IL-76 in Service, by N. Gus'kov

Dress Code: New Decree
(SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITEL'STVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK, No 1, 1980)..... 10

Veteran's Benefits: New Decree
(SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITEL'STVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK, No 16-17, 1980)..... 11

Soviet Foreign Policy: Peace-loving Nature Stressed
(K. Tikhoobrazov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 12

Wartime Operations: Preoffensive Intelligence Work
(R. Simonyan; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 19

Wartime Operations: Organization of Air Defense Troops
(V. Gorbunov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 26

Wartime Operations: Logistic Support in an Offensive
(K. Abramov; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 34

Naval Forces: Visit to Vietnam in 1979 Described
(V. Samarkin; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 43

Wartime Operations: Yugoslav Art of Warfare
(Nikola Anic; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 50

Military Theory: Engels' Contribution Noted
(V. Shumikhin; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 55

Book Review: Kapitsa's Book on China's Foreign Policy
(M.S. Kapitsa; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 63

Book Review: Wartime Tank Maintenance Procedures
(A.P. Shvebig; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 67

Book Review: Syrian Defense Minister on Armed Forces Development
(Mustafa Talas; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 69

Aviation Engineering Academy: 60th Anniversary Article
(A. Shtoda; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 73

Biographical Data on Army General Kurochkin
(P. Dunayev; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 76

Biographical Data on Army General Shchelokov
(K. Grushevoy; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nov 80)..... 80

Political Indoctrination: Commander Transcaucasus MD
(O. Kulishev; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 7 Aug 80)..... 83

MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS: LEGAL VIOLATIONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Col Justice V. Gushchin, judge advocate-inspector, candidate of laws: "To Prevent Accidents--Comments of a Military Legal Specialist"]

[Text] The operator had done everything he could, but the heavy tracked prime mover stubbornly refused to move. It seemed to be pushing against some invisible barrier and slid relentlessly toward the ditch at the left side of the road. Finally, it struck a truck parked on the shoulder and plunged heavily into the ditch....

This is what is known in the books as a traffic accident. It would be said that Private A. Kovalev, the driver, had lost control. But how could he have lost control? He did everything he could, after all. Private A. Kovalev was only trained to drive trucks. This was his first time at the controls of a tracked vehicle. The fact that he was assigned to make the ill-fated trip was nothing short of negligence on the part of those in charge, primarily Lieutenant Colonel A. Bobylev. Those in charge had grossly violated regulations on permitting drivers to operate the transport equipment.

It is apparent that accidents can have far deeper underlying causes than those indicated in the findings of motor transport experts. This is why it is so important to combat traffic accidents and near accidents.

Unbiased statistics indicate that drivers are at fault in almost three quarters of the accidents. The driver was the most important link in the chain of circumstances leading to the accident in which the vehicle went off the road. This is especially true in the military, where powerful and complex vehicles are operated by young drivers. Unfortunately, it is impossible to avoid this situation. The characteristics of the equipment are determined by the demands of modern warfare, and the draft age accounts for the youth of the operators. Nonetheless, constant attention must be given to the military operator. First of all, he must fully possess the essential psychophysiological qualities of good health, rapid reaction, decisiveness, initiative, and so forth. This is why careful selection and thorough medical examination of individuals aspiring to become drivers are the earliest means of preventing future accidents. Despite this, we have encountered frequent cases in which military commissariats send

youths to DOSAAF motor vehicle schools without considering these characteristics of the jobs they will be performing. For example, a medical examination of young drivers carried out at the suggestion of the judge advocate at one of the garrisons in the Far East Military District revealed that more than 70 of the individuals examined were psychophysiologically unfit to operate vehicles.

The operators' training has an especially large role in preventing violations of vehicle operation and maintenance rules. Third-class specialists typically have twice as many accidents per 1,000 operators as do first- and second-class drivers. In short, in all cases training the drivers and raising the class ratings constitute one of the most important tasks of commanders at all levels.

In the outstanding motor transport subunits and units all the diverse means of raising class ratings and improving skills are used for this purpose, including special classes, scientific and technical conferences, quizzes, summarizing and disseminating the best operators' experience, analyzing the causes of accidents which do occur, working out recommendations for the prevention of motor vehicle accidents, and so forth.

There have been no motor transport accidents for more than four years in the military unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. Sviridov. We can learn from the exemplary organization and the motor transport service in general and from the work performed with vehicle operators and commanders in particular. Vehicle maintenance work in the unit is set up strictly according to the manuals. A motor vehicle which has not been readied for the trip, and especially one in a state of disrepair or lacking the proper documents would never get through the gate at the technical control point. All personnel in charge in this unit's motor transport service performed their service duties with a view to preventing any situation which could result in an accident.

In addition to commanders and those in charge in the motor transport service, the Military Automotive Inspection Service (VAI) also monitors the fulfillments of requirements contained in manuals of the USSR Armed Forces, regulations, orders and directives aimed at insuring accident-free operation of the equipment and its use for the purpose for which it was intended in accordance with established technical standards and rules. The VAI is charged with organizing and conducting measures to prevent motor transport accidents in the forces by analyzing their causes and preconditions.

The work of the VAI is not properly organized in all cases, however. An inspection of the VAI in one garrison by the judge advocate's office, for example disclosed that driver's licenses had been removed from 50 drivers by state motor transport inspectors for various violations of traffic rules. The licenses had been held at the VAI for several months, and no steps had been taken against the guilty parties.

However, Colonel O. Klimenko, garrison VAI commander, had punched warning slips for incidents not involving violations of traffic regulations or rules governing the operation of transport equipment. These clearly illegal acts resulted in justifiable complaints and, naturally, they did nothing to help develop discipline in the operators.

Many violations of traffic and vehicle operation rules are still not being investigated. Fairly frequently the causes are not brought out and the guilty parties are not held accountable. Fictitious excerpts from nonexistent orders calling for the punishment of operators and officials are sometimes submitted to VAI offices. For example, Engineer-Captain A. Gordiyenko, a deputy unit commander, wrote up more than 10 such excerpts from unit orders, stating that violators of traffic regulations had been brought to account for their actions. In view of this harmful practice it is no surprise that during the past six months alone drivers in this unit have committed more than 60 violations of traffic discipline.

Any deviation from the rules governing vehicle operation and maintenance and any lack of demandingness and principle can result in motor vehicle accidents--the damage or destruction of vehicles and death or injury to the people. In addition to this, any accident or catastrophe in the army may to some degree disrupt the work of the troops and lower their combat readiness. This not only illustrates the great public danger which results from this type of violation of regulations, it also makes the task of preventing them one of the important matters within the system of measures to maintain the troops in a constant state of combat readiness.

11499
CSO: 1801

AIRBORNE TROOPS: TACTICAL TRAINING DESCRIBED

Raiding Actions in Enemy Rear

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen K. Kurochkin, deputy commander of Airborne Troops: "In the Enemy's Rear Area"]

> [Text] Raiding action tactics receive a great deal of attention in the practical combat training of the Airborne Troops. Exercises have shown this to be a difficult operation, one demanding good professional expertise, the ability to operate independently and with initiative on the part of the commander, and a high level of training on the part of all personnel. I would like for all KRASNAYA ZVEZDA to describe the history of the development of raiding action tactics and of their specific characteristics in modern combat.--From a speech delivered by Guards Major V. Panteleyev at a readers' conference.

The fighting around Moscow was in its final stage. Army General G. Zhukov, commander of the Western Front, decided to use an airborne landing operation to help the advancing forces rout the German fascist troops near Vyaz'ma.

On the night of 28 January 1942 he ., TB-3s took off from temporary airfields with an airborne landing force on board. They headed for Vyaz'ma. Forward detachments of the 8th Airborne Brigade were the first to land in the enemy's rear area. One of them was commanded by Guards Major A. Kobets. The personnel were rapidly assembled and the battalion set about performing the assigned mission: to move up to the Vyaz'ma-Smolensk highway and railway and seal them off.

Upon reaching the designated points on the highway and railway Guards Major Kobets set up roadblocks. The airborne troops carefully concealed themselves, permitted a column of Hitlerite vehicles to draw near and then destroyed it with a surprise attack.

This was the beginning of raiding actions by the largest corps-size airborne landing force of the Great Patriotic War. The corps consisted of the 8th, 9th and 214th Airborne Brigades and was commanded by Major General A. Kazaikin.

Despite great difficulties--the minimum quantity of artillery (primarily battalion mortars), limited ammunition, the absence of support from the front aviation and the harsh winter conditions--the airborne troops inflicted major losses in personnel and equipment upon the fascists on the Vyaz'ma axis.

For five months the airborne troops engaged in fierce fighting with the enemy's regular forces. In fact they created an active, moving front in the enemy's rear area. Carrying out raids as they went, liberating more than 200 communities and destroying around 17,000 Hitlerites, the main forces of the 4th Airborne Corps, together with Lieutenant General P. Belov's cavalry, penetrated the enemy's defenses and on 23 June arrived in the deployment area of units of the Western Front's 10th Army.

The raiding actions carried out by the airborne troops varied. They depended upon the combat missions and the conditions under which the missions were performed. The airborne troops would outflank enemy strong points, find weak spots on the defended axes and sectors and take advantage of gaps between groupings of fascist forces. If an attempt failed they would switch their effort to a new axis. As they carried out the raids the airborne troops interacted closely with cavalry units and took advantage of help from partisans.

Maneuver-attack-maneuver--these interlinked battle elements formed a sort of model and the basis of raid action tactics.

Raids have a large role and are highly important in modern combat as well. This is due to the very nature of the combined-arms battle--its great mobility and intensity, its increased territorial scope and the rapid rate of advance.

The new equipment and weapons being received by the forces are having a considerable effect upon raid action tactics. Units and subunits of the Airborne Troops are now outfitted not only with advanced automatic small-arms but also with highly effective systems for inflicting fire damage upon the enemy, reliable antitank and anti-aircraft target systems, and reliable communication facilities. Suffice it to say that the fire power and maneuverability of the subunits were increased more than 2-fold over the prewar capability simply by outfitting the troops with airborne combat vehicles (BMD), which have good armor protection, a good cross-country ability and a long operating range.

These changes have increased the tactical independence of units and subunits of the Airborne Troops, their mobility and self-sufficiency. This makes it possible to conduct combat operations at great depth, to attack the enemy unexpectedly from the march and to capture or destroy with relatively small forces airfields, control posts and headquarters, nuclear missile installations and important enemy lines of communication.

During last year's "Neman" exercises, for example, an airborne (parachute) battalion commanded by Guards Captain L. Arshinov, landed in the "enemy's" rear area and carried out a raid to reach another area, forestalling the opponent in the occupation of a strategically advantageous line. The swift attack, the element of surprise and close interaction with fire support helicopters predetermined the outcome of the battle.

One of the characteristics of raids is the diversity of combat operations. Within a brief period of time the subunits will have to pursue the enemy, conduct a meeting engagement, switch a defense and withstand attacks to move to new and more advantageous lines. Commando-type actions, mined obstacles, raids (nalety) and ambushes will be extensively employed.

The enemy, of course, will do everything possible to pin down, seal off and destroy the airborne landing force. It is with good reason then that the most important demand made of a raid is for concealment and speed in maneuvering. It must provide for prompt and complete utilization of the effects of the artillery strike and air attacks, the rapid negotiation or bypassing of areas of devastation by the subunits, and a buildup of combat efforts on the crucial axes.

Modern combat will not tolerate routine actions, and such actions in the enemy's rear are doubly dangerous. We need to emphasize the fact that the success of a raid depends upon a high level of creative action, a quest for original tactical procedures, resourcefulness and common sense on the part of the commander. In one case the enemy has to be attacked and destroyed from the march, while in another situation it will be necessary to detour around the enemy, to decline battle in order to deliver a sudden swift attack where the enemy does not expect it.

As a rule, limited time is available to set up a raid, but this in no way makes it permissible to neglect the organization of interaction and support for the raid or the setting up of the battle formation. The possibility that the enemy will employ aircraft and means of mass destruction, sabotage, ambushes and barriers makes this matter especially urgent.

Stable control and precise interaction with attached subunits, including the fire support helicopters which frequently assist the airborne landing group, are especially important. The importance of stable communications also increases. Success is achieved by the commander who responds rapidly, without hesitation to changes in the situation, who explains the missions to the subunits briefly and precisely.

We should underscore the fact that the success of a raid depends greatly upon the organization of party-political work and the focus and concreteness with which it is conducted, taking into account the type of combat operations involved.

The history of tactics contains numerous examples of a skillful, thoroughly conceived approach to the drilling of subunits for a raid. I recall an exercise involving the landing of a certain Guards airborne (parachute) regiment. The battalion commanded by Guards Captain A. Kinzerskiy was landed in a mountain area and during the course of the battle was instructed to capture an "enemy" crossing.

Guards Captain Kinzerskiy made plans to reach the target at night by way of mountain roads. Although this was a difficult route it provided the greatest assurance of traveling without detection. The company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Monakhov was assigned the mission of detouring and approaching the flank of the "enemy" defending the crossing.

The absence of complete information on the defenses prevented the commander from specifically defining the missions. Aside from the column's order of march, only the start lines and axes of the attack were indicated. The stake was on determination and speed of action.

Subsequent events confirmed the correctness of this. Upon reaching the river and failing to find sloping banks from which to enter the water Guards Senior Lieutenant Monakhov decided to risk forcing the water barrier from the steep bank. It was a risk, unquestionably, but a justified one, based upon confidence in the skill and courage of the driver-mechanics and the combat capabilities of the airborne combat vehicles.

The commander's vehicle was the first to "plunge" into the water. It disappeared beneath the water for an instant, but it immediately surfaced and set out rapidly for the opposite bank. The others rushed in behind it.

At dawn Guards Senior Lieutenant Monakhov's men began attacking the flank in accordance with the battalion commander's concept. Sensing the danger of a breakthrough by the airborne troops on this sector, the "enemy" launched a counter attack, removing part of the forces from other sectors of the defense for this purpose.

During this time the main battalion forces carried out a conventional attack and set out for the crossing at great speed. The outcome of the battle was determined in a matter of minutes.

I could describe many such examples. I want especially to focus attention upon the fact that the path to success in operations conducted in the enemy's rear area lies in combating simplification and routine in the day-to-day training. A great deal also rests upon the teamwork of the small subunits, the field and special training of the airborne troops and their ability to operate with daring, boldness and determination.

Unfortunately, some commanders and headquarters create an insufficiently dynamic ground and air situation when they work out the concept for a tactical exercise. Simple missions are assigned and the enemy is small and passive. A raid sometimes essentially consists of the march alone. As a result neither the commanders nor their men acquire the skills necessary for carrying out raiding actions or receive a true understanding of the nature and the characteristics of such actions.

In one exercise the battalion commanded by Guards Captain A. Matsuyev had to carry out a raid a long distance away. And what happened? The combat vehicles arrived at the designated area precisely on schedule. On the trip, however, as it turned out, they had not once been attacked by the "enemy," had not repelled any air attacks and had not destroyed any of the enemy with their own forces. It was learned that simplified exercises had been conducted there previously. This sort of thing is not to be tolerated, of course.

Readiness for highly mobile actions in the enemy's rear area is an important indicator of the cohesiveness of subunits and units of the Airborne Troops and of

their level of mobility and combat readiness. To study the tactics of raiding actions and to perfect them in every respect in classes and exercises in the course of flight training is to raise the combat readiness and the field training of the Airborne Troops to a new and higher level.

Airborne Troops: IL-76 in Service

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 8, Aug 80 pp 3-4

[Article by Lt Gen N. Gus'kov, deputy commander of Airborne Troops: "Fighting Men of the 'Winged Guard'"]

> [Excerpts] "The Central Committee can assure the Soviet people that we have everything we need to repel any military acts of provocation. The peaceful future of the Soviet state is insured, and reliably insured."--L.I. Brezhnev

I recall once attending an exercise which included an airborne landing operation. An amazing sight! It made an indelible impression even upon me, a person who had been around, as they say.

...High-speed military transport planes--the famous An-22 ("Antey") and Il-76, the latest word in aircraft design--swept over the area. Now they were on the operational flight course, and the skies suddenly became crowded with the white canopies of parachutes. Heavy combat equipment--guns and vehicles--approached the ground. The white canopies were bearing fighting men and commanders of the winged Guards to earth. If necessary, they would advance like an uncontrolled avalanche into battle against any enemy which might dare to encroach upon the peaceful labor of our homeland. Their attack is powerful and invincible.

With respect to the weapons and combat equipment with which today's Airborne Troops are outfitted, they cannot be compared with either the equipment used during the war or that of the first postwar years. Such enormous changes have occurred in the armament and equipment, as well as the combat employment of the troops, that we can rightly speak of a real revolution in military affairs as a whole and in the Airborne Troops in particular.

The above was confirmed by the assault landing exercises "Dnepr," "Dvina," "Yug," "Vesna-75" and "Shchit-79"..., which are now a part of our history. The combat capabilities of the Airborne Troops and our views on their combat employment were tested in all these exercises and maneuvers. They measure up to the present level of military science and art.

Our awesome combat equipment and most advanced weapons are the product of Soviet designing, the creation of our engineers and the priceless hands of the workers. They are physical evidence of the truly enormous paternal concern constantly shown by our Leninist Communist Party for the development and improvement of the Airborne Troops. All these troops--from the commander to the private--express the most profound filial gratitude to the party for this concern.

This gratitude has taken concrete form in the intense military work begun by the Airborne Troops this anniversary year at the training fields, firing grounds, ranges and airfields. All the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers this year are working in the shock-labor manner, in the Leninist way. It is the airborne fighters who are the greatest treasure and pride of the Airborne Troops. Almost all the officers and generals are communists, and more than 80 percent of the soldiers and sergeants are Komsomol members. Infinitely devoted to the homeland, always prepared to fulfill with honor an order from the party and government, and with a perfect mastery of their weapons and combat equipment--this is how the Soviet people regard the airborne fighters, fighting men of the "winged Guard," the men in the blue berets.

The political awareness, stamina, good morale and fighting efficiency of our soldiers, sergeants and officers have been confirmed in action more than once. They have now been confirmed once again, in Afghanistan, where a limited number of Soviet troops were sent at the invitation of Babrak Karmal's government--to provide fraternal assistance to protect the conquests of the revolution against external aggression instigated by the American imperialists and their Chinese accomplices.

In the course of my service I have known many of the airborne fighters--commanders, chiefs and political workers--true masters of their jobs with infinite love for their heroic military profession. Officers M. Arabin, Ye. Otlivanchik and V. Lyakhov, like many of their fellow soldiers, are active in the development and mastery of airborne landing equipment and of new types of military air transports, and have produced many valuable proposals for improving the airborne landing technology and equipment.

And when it has been necessary, the communists, veterans of the Airborne Troops, have been out front, demonstrating outstanding personal courage and heroism. I recall the time a very difficult parachute drop had to be made during the testing of the new Il-76. The most experienced instructors in the airborne training, officers and communists, were selected to make the jump. The group was headed by officer Ye. S. Otlivanchik. The tests were successful.

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11499
CSO: 1801

DRESS CODE: NEW DECREE

Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITEL'STVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 1, 1980 p 7

[Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] 3: On Prohibiting the Wearing of Uniforms and Insignia Similar or Identical to the Uniform and the Insignia Worn by Military Personnel of the USSR Armed Forces

The USSR Council of Ministers hereby decrees:

1. That ministries, state committees and departments of the USSR, Union and autonomous republics are forbidden to adopt for blue- and white-collar workers uniforms and insignia similar or identical to uniforms and insignia worn by military personnel of the USSR Armed Forces.

That it be established that if it becomes necessary to adopt uniforms and insignia for certain categories of blue- and white-collar workers or to make changes in the present uniform and insignia, proposals on the matter are to be submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers after receiving preliminary approval of such proposals from the Ministry of Defense.

2. That Decree No 2056 passed by the USSR Sovnarkom on 14 September 1935 (SZ USSR, No 51, 1935, Article 425) be declared no longer in effect.

Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers,
A. Kosygin

Administrator of Af'airs, USSR Council
of Ministers,
M. Smirtyukov

Moscow, The Kremlin, 22 November 1979, No 1039

11499
CSO: 1801

VETERANS' BENEFITS: NEW DECREE

Moscow SOBRANIYE POSTANOVLENIY PRAVITEL'STVA SOYUZA SOVETSKIKH SOTSIALISTICHESKIKH RESPUBLIK in Russian No 16-17, 1980 p 395 Article 102

[Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers]

[Text] 102: On Further Improving Pensions, Material and Personal-Service Provisions for Disabled Veterans of the Patriotic War and the Families of Servicemen Killed at the Front.

The USSR Council of Ministers hereby decrees:

1. That it be recognized as appropriate:

a) To grant pensions for loss of breadwinner to the wives of servicemen killed at the front, regardless of whether they were being supported by the deceased serviceman and regardless of when they reach old age or when they become disabled;

b) To grant full pensions to pensioned servicemen and individuals receiving pensions for loss of a serviceman-breadwinner, without the 15 percent reduction specified for pensioners permanently residing in rural areas and involved in agriculture.

That a draft ukase on these matters be submitted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

2. That it be established that disabled Patriotic War veterans in group I are at their request to be paid the sum of 80 rubles once every two years in lieu of a trip to a sanatorium or a rest center.

That monetary payment for 1980-1981 be made in 1981.

Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers,
A. Kosygin

Administrator of Affairs, USSR Council of Ministers,
M. Smirtyukov

Moscow, The Kremlin, 26 May 1980, No 410

11499
CSO: 1801

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: PEACE-LOVING NATURE STRESSED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 28 Oct 80 pp 3-8

[Article by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col K. Tikhoobrazov: "The Struggle of the CPSU for Peace and Security of Nations"]

[Text] The peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet state derives from the very essence of socialism. Socialism and peace are inseparable. The real opportunities of preventing wars between peoples arose precisely with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In the first law of the just-born Soviet power, the Peace Decree, the belligerents were pressed to accept an immediate peace without annexation or indemnities. The decree established new relations between states. It proclaimed the principle of peace, friendship and respect for all nations regardless of their political and economic importance on the international scene.

"We reject all points about plunder and violence," pointed out V. I. Lenin, "but we happily accept all points which include conditions of good neighbors and economic agreements, and these we cannot reject."[1] Even the first documents of Soviet power, in essence, proclaimed ideas about the possibility of peaceful coexistence of a socialist country with the capitalist states. But the imperialists, and primarily Germany, England, France, the United States and Japan, dissatisfied with the very fact of the appearance of a Soviet republic, with the peace-loving foreign policy of the new state and its withdrawal from the imperialist war, began an overt military intervention against the Soviet nation.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government in this difficult situation undertook every measure to create a powerful Red Army, to defend the victories of October, to split the anti-Soviet imperialist front, to achieve peaceful relations with the capitalist countries, and begin building socialism. The Soviet nation in its foreign policy was guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, and this presently underlies Soviet foreign policy.

However the predatory nature of imperialism has forced the Soviet Union to be constantly on guard and to keep its powder dry. V. I. Lenin pointed out: "It must be remembered that we are always a hair's breadth away from invasion. We will do everything in our power to prevent this calamity."[2] For this reason, in defending the peace policy, our party strengthened the economic might of the Soviet nation, increased its defense capability and created a powerful Army and Navy.

At the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's, the capitalist world experienced a severe economic crisis which intensified the contradictions between the imperialists in the struggle for the apportionment of colonies, for willing markets, sources of raw materials and military springboards. The way out of this situation was seen by the imperialist circles in strengthening preparations for a new war, primarily against the USSR.

Under the conditions of a threat of world war, the Soviet Union, in strengthening its defense might, made a number of important initiatives aimed at preserving peace and lessening international tension. In 1932, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the USSR proposed a program of universal and full disarmament and a draft for maximum reduction in weapons as a first step on the way to this goal. The Soviet government proposed the complete destruction of the most aggressive types of weapons (tanks, super long-range artillery, bomber aviation, and chemical and bacteriological weapons, and so forth).

In 1936, our nation was one of the first in the League of Nations to favor the creation of a system of collective security against fascist aggression. However the efforts of the USSR were not supported, since the imperialist states were carrying out a policy of "nonintervention" and encouragement of the aggressors. "History," pointed out L. I. Brezhnev, "has harshly punished the 'conciliators' who rejected all the proposals of the Soviet government about a collective rebuff to the fascist aggressors."[1]

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party and the Soviet government continued to carry out an active foreign policy, working to consolidate the antifascist front of peoples, providing help to the patriotic forces of the Nazi-occupied European countries, for the opening up of a second front by England and the United States, and for creating optimum international conditions for the most rapid completion of the war and the establishing of a lasting democratic postwar peace. The Soviet Union made an important contribution to the founding of the United Nations.

The postwar period was characterized by the formation of new socialist countries. The socialist system, with its constantly growing economic and defense potential, became a center of natural attraction for all the peace-loving forces in the world. The strong national liberation movement led to the elimination of the colonial system of imperialism and to the formation of around 100 independent states. A majority of them supports the peace-loving policy of the USSR, and follows a path of nonalignment and noninvolvement in the aggressive military blocs.

The international communist and workers movement which has become stronger in the postwar era has made a major contribution to the cause of strengthening peace. A greater role has been played by the mass antiwar movement in the various countries and all peace-loving forces who defend universal peace and international security. The Communist Party and the Soviet government have structured their foreign policy considering these fundamental changes.

Even in 1946, the USSR proposed to the UN a program for a universal reduction in weapons and the banning of atomic weapons. The People's Democracies and the progressive forces of the entire world strongly supported the USSR in its initiatives. During these years, for the purposes of lessening international tension, the USSR

submitted proposals to the United Nations on halting imperialist intervention in Greece and Indonesia and on pulling English and French troops out of Syria and Lebanon, it raised the question of the stationing of UN troops on the territory of a number of countries which had not been in the bloc of fascist states during the period of World War II.

The imperialist circles of the Western countries, and primarily the United States, in contrast to the peaceful Soviet proposals, developed a "Cold War" against all revolutionary and progressive forces of the world, and this for a long time poisoned the international atmosphere and entailed an unrestrained arms race in the capitalist countries and the putting together of aggressive military blocs. Thus, NATO was created in 1949, and SEATO in 1954. In May 1955, West Germany became a member of NATO.

Under a situation of the "Cold War," and in response to the aggressive actions of the imperialists, the CPSU and the Soviet government were forced to increase vigilance and show particular concern for strengthening the defense capability of the nation. In September 1949, the U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons was eliminated, and in 1953, our scientists developed the hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Army and Navy received nuclear missile weapons and more advanced military equipment. In May 1955, as a counterweight to NATO, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia formed the Warsaw Pact.[5] All of this contributed to a significant rise in the defense might of the USSR and the entire socialist system, and strengthened their positions on the international scene.

From the moment of its creation up to the present, the Warsaw Pact has reliably served the interests of peace and socialism. Its Political Consultative Committee has made numerous various proposals on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. These have been reflected in the decisions of major international forums and approved international treaties.[6]

Over the last 2 decades, imperialism has repeatedly endeavored to complicate the international situation, unleash an aggressive war against individual states, and block the peaceful proposals of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth. Due to the decisive actions of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries, the aggression by the American imperialists against Cuba and Vietnam was turned back, freedom was won in Laos and Kampuchea, the Czechoslovak people were supported in the defense of socialism, the prerequisites were created for a stable peace and cooperation among states in Europe, and the hostile actions of China against Vietnam were thwarted. Our country also helped to defend the national independence and revolutionary victories of the peoples of Angola, Ethiopia and other states.

An important event in international life was the Conference on European Security and Cooperation held in Helsinki in 1975 upon the initiative of the Warsaw Pact states. Its Final Act defined the basic principles for relations among the 33 states of Europe, the United States and Canada. They correspond to the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and which were advanced by V. I. Lenin. The USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth are fighting decisively for their unswerving observance by all the countries which signed this document.

In carrying out a peace-loving foreign policy, the USSR has always and is providing effective aid to the revolutionary liberation movement of peoples. In this regard, it is wise to remind certain leaders in the capitalist countries and their ideological hangers-on who have created such a stir over the so-called "Afghan question," that some 60 years ago, upon the initiative of V. I. Lenin, good neighbor relations began to be established between our state and Afghanistan. During the years of intervention and the Civil War, Soviet Russia supported the Afghan people in their struggle for independence and was the first in 1919 to recognize the sovereignty of this country. In accord with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation concluded in December 1978, and in response to repeated requests by the Afghan government, the Soviet Union introduced a limited troop contingent on Afghan territory for repelling foreign aggression.

At the beginning of the 1970's, the USSR, together with the fraternal socialist countries, continued to work for implementing the policy of peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems and for reducing international tension, and struggled to halt the arms race and to achieve universal and complete disarmament. This policy was reflected in the Peace Program approved at the 24th CPSU Congress and was further developed in the decisions of the 25th Party Congress. "...The program," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "pointed to a real way to eliminate the Cold War, and set clear tasks in the struggle to move from the danger of wars to peaceful cooperation."[7]

Upon the initiative of the USSR and the other socialist countries, numerous UN resolutions were worked out and approved, and a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements were signed aimed at maintaining peace and preventing a worldwide nuclear missile war and local wars between states. These include: the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (1968), the treaty on prohibiting the deployment of these weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction on the floor of seas and oceans (1971), the Convention on Banning the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and Their Destruction (1972), a temporary agreement between the USSR and United States on certain measures in the area of restricting strategic offensive weapons (1972), the agreement between the USSR and France on preventing the accidental and unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons (1976), and others. The USSR has established and maintains diplomatic and trade relations with more than 130 countries of the world, and has concluded various agreements and treaties with many of them. There are more than 50 between the USSR and the United States alone.[8]

In describing the results of the party's activities to carry out the Peace Program, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in replies to a PRAVDA correspondent emphasized: "...The main thing that we have succeeded in doing is precisely to break out of the tragic cycle: world war--a brief breathing space of peace--and a new world war."[9]

At the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's, the international situation in the world became noticeably more complex. The imperialist circles and the leaders of the NATO military bloc, and primarily the United States, in endeavoring to check the objective process of the renewal of the world, have carried out a policy of strengthening the arms race, undertaking provocations against the socialist and other independent states, of greater militaristic activities by NATO and broadening its functions as a tool of imperialist dictatorship. In endeavoring to justify their policy aimed at undermining detente, the U.S. aggressive circles have

unleashed a broad anti-Soviet campaign over events in Afghanistan, and are carrying out a number of measures permeated by a "Cold War" spirit, and by a disregard for the fundamental long-term interests of peace and a lessening of international tension. Upon a decision of the U.S. Senate, the question of ratifying the Salt-2 Treaty was deferred, and economic, scientific-technical and cultural ties with the Soviet Union were curtailed. The governments of the United States and certain NATO countries have set out on a policy of increasing the arms race and raising military budgets. The United States has forced on its NATO partners a decision to deploy new nuclear missiles in a number of the Western European countries, it is continuing to threaten intervention in Iran, it is supplying weapons, training and helping to send counterrevolutionary bands into Afghanistan. The CPSU Central Committee, having reviewed the results of the meetings of the leaders of the fraternal parties and states in the Crimea in July-August 1980, emphasized that a political settlement to the situation in Afghanistan would help to improve the world political climate. However, "the United States as well as China are creating obstacles to this, and they, using primarily Pakistan for these purposes, are artificially increasing tension over Afghanistan."[10]

The hegemonistic policy and militaristic course of the Maoists have also played an important role in exacerbating international tension. Their rabid hostility to the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth is supported in the imperialist circles of a number of countries, and above all the United States. "The partnership of imperialism and Beijing hegemonism," states the Decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "represents a new dangerous phenomenon in world politics, a dangerous one for all mankind, including for the American and Chinese peoples."[11] Beijing has long viewed the USSR as the "number one enemy," and has endeavored to put together "the broadest united front" with the participation of the imperialists and reactionaries of all hues for fighting against our country and the entire socialist commonwealth, and against the developing countries, where revolutionary democratic changes are being implemented.

In this complex international situation, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, without giving in to the provocations and at the same time rebuffing the imperialist claims, have shown truly Leninist restraint, firmness and loyalty to principles, and have consistently defended and carried out a policy of maintaining peace and ensuring international security. This can be seen from their new proposals worked out in May 1980 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States and set forth in the Declaration.

The Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which was held on 23 June 1980, on the report of the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, approved the Decree "On the International Situation and Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union." This decree emphasizes that the party will steadfastly continue the course of the 24th and 25th congresses of the greatest possible strengthening of the fraternal union of the socialist states, it will support the just struggle of the peoples for freedom and independence, of peaceful coexistence, the halting of the arms race, the maintaining and development of international detente, as well as mutually advantageous cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural areas.

At the same time the plenum pointed out that the intrigues of the enemies of peace require constant vigilance and the greatest possible strengthening of our state's

economic capability, as well as greater combat readiness of the Army and Navy so as to thwart the plans of imperialism which is striving for military superiority and the dictating of terms to the world.

In order to put an end to the arms race, the Soviet Union has come forward with major initiatives, having proposed without delay to start talks on medium-range nuclear missile weapons in Europe in organic relation to the American nuclear forward based weapons. The USSR has made specific proposals at the talks to reduce armed forces and weapons in Central Europe considering the position of the Western participants at these talks. The proposals of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries were approved by the international community and have been viewed as convincing proof of the purposeful activities in the defense of peace. "We are loyal to the Peace Program proposed by the 24th and 25th congresses of our party," pointed out Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. "For this reason, at present, in the 1980's, as before in the 1970's, we are in favor of the strengthening and not the destruction of detente. We are in favor of reducing and not increasing weapons. We are for the coming together and mutual understanding between peoples, and not for artificial alienation and hostility."[12] All attempts by American imperialism and its supporters to alter the balance of forces on the international scene, to thwart detente and to check the course of history are doomed to defeat.

The Leninist peace-loving foreign policy has been, is and will be a policy of the active defense of the peace and security of peoples. In steadfastly carrying it out, the Communist Party at the same time is concerned with the strengthening of the defense might of the nation and increasing the combat readiness of its Armed Forces. These two areas in the activities of the CPSU are organically combined and are inseparable. Under the conditions of the greater aggressiveness of imperialism, peace must be defended. The policy of peace has nothing in common with pacifism. The USSR and the countries of the socialist commonwealth have always acted and are acting on the side of those who are waging a just, liberation struggle. The USSR and the fraternal socialist countries are not seeking military superiority over the NATO bloc, but also cannot permit such superiority over themselves by the United States and its allies. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has clearly stated: "We are not about to weaken our defenses when confronted with the growing military might of imperialism, regardless of what demagogic arguments are used to cover up the appeals for this. This would have irretrievable consequences both for the cause of socialism and for the cause of the liberty and independence of peoples."[13]

In preparing to celebrate its 26th Congress, our party, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said in a speech at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee held on 21 October 1980, is moving "in close unity with the people, with a clear program of actions in the area of domestic and foreign policy."[14] The peoples of the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries are fully determined to even further strengthen the alliance of our armies, and to increase their military might and combat readiness, the basis for effectively carrying out Lenin's peace-loving foreign policy.

FOOTNOTES

[1]V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 20.

[2]Ibid., Vol 44, pp 296-297.

[3]L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom" [By the Leninist Course], Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p 122.

[4]Albania has not participated in the work of the Warsaw Pact since 1962, and in September 1968, unilaterally abrogated the treaty.

[5][Not in text.]

[6]See "Materialy XXV S"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, p 8.

[7]Ibid., p 17.

[8]See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', No 3, 1980, p 10.

[9]PRAVDA, 13 January 1980.

[10]Ibid., 24 August 1980.

[11]Ibid., 24 June 1980.

[12]Ibid., 23 February 1980.

[13]L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim Kursom," Vol 7, 1980, pp 549-550.

[14]PRAVDA, 22 October 1980.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: PREOFFENSIVE INTELLIGENCE WORK

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Doctor of Military Sciences, Maj Gen R. Simonyan: "From the Experience of Conducting Reconnaissance During the Preparatory Period and in the Course of a Frontal Offensive Operation"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] During the entire history of wars, reconnaissance has had a constant and important influence on the course and outcome of a battle, an operation and the war as a whole. For this reason the art of organizing and conducting it has been continuously improved, particularly during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Much that was worked out then by theory and tested out on the battlefields has maintained its value also under present-day conditions.

The given article is aimed at briefly taking up certain questions in the conduct of reconnaissance in the first Belorussian Front (Commander, Mar SU G. K. Zhukov) during the Berlin Offensive Operation (16 April-8 May 1945), where use was made of the rich experience of reconnaissance activities of the troops and staffs as acquired and creatively assimilated during the war years.

The conducting of reconnaissance during the preparatory period of the operation assumed a broad scope. Operational reconnaissance conducted 1,800 reconnaissance sweeps, and captured 1,400 prisoners and seized 2,000 various enemy documents. For around-the-clock observation, the troops of the front set up a dense network of observation posts which had direct communication with the staffs of their units and formations. In the zones of the 5th Assault Army and the 8th Guards Army alone (commanders, Col Gens N. E. Berzarin and V. I. Chuykov), there were 1,800 of them, not counting the company and battalion ones.[1] The density of observation posts per kilometer was more than 80 units. At the divisional, corps and army posts, staff officers were on duty around the clock. For the purposes of increasing the depth of reconnaissance, extensive use was made of sending well-trained reconnaissance groups into the enemy positions. As a result operational reconnaissance had made a rather detailed study of all the enemy groupings within the limits of the main defensive zone. By the start of the operation, it had acquired complete data on the fighting strength and formations of the fascist formations which were on the defensive in the first echelon. Along with engineer reconnaissance, it also established the particular features of the structure of the Oder Neisse Defensive Line.

Artillery reconnaissance and observation were carried out by 16 reconnaissance artillery battalions, of which 11 operated in the sector of the main thrust in the battle formations of the troops occupying the bridgehead on the western bank of the Oder River, that is, on a 22-km sector of the 175-km zone of the front. Thus, in a sector comprising just 12.5 percent of the zone of the front's offensive, up to 69 percent of the reconnaissance artillery battalions was concentrated.

Air reconnaissance. During the period of preparing for the operation, the aviation of the front carried out 2,580 reconnaissance aircraft sorties. The entire system of enemy defensive works to a depth of 70-90 km, including Berlin, was photographed several times. Individual areas were photographed five-eight times.[3] On the basis of the aerial photographs and the data of other types of reconnaissance, reconnaissance maps were prepared (with a scale of 1:50,000 and 1:100,000). These maps were issued to all the staffs and company (battery) commanders, inclusively. For comparison we might point out that in the preceding operations of the front, they were issued to the commanders of battalions. Using the aerial photography data, the available maps of Berlin with a scale of 1:15,000 were adjusted, and new ones issued to the troops (1:25,000), and all officers received these down to the platoon commanders, inclusively. For the purposes of the optimum use of the capabilities of the air reconnaissance of the front, permanent sections and areas of reconnaissance were assigned to each crew of reconnaissance aircraft.

Signals intelligence established the position of the enemy troops of the 3d Tank Army and 9th Army, the staffs of all the corps and 15 of the 25 enemy divisions. With its aid, the staff of the front during the first days of April succeeded in disclosing the operational regroupings of the enemy for reinforcing the Berlin sector at the expense of weakening its Stettin grouping.

Simultaneously with the conducting of reconnaissance, the staffs of the formations and field forces carried out great work in preparing the reconnaissance bodies for actions with the opening up of the operation. For example, in the 8th Guards Army, the reconnaissance units and subunits were brought up to full strength. At assemblies of the intelligence chiefs of the divisions and regiments, an analysis was made of the activities of operational reconnaissance in the course of the Vistula-Oder Operation, and the combat experience of the best intelligence bodies was generalized. Material was worked out and sent out to the units and formations on organizing and conducting reconnaissance in large cities such as Poznan and Kostrzyn which by that time had already been liberated. In each division, motorized reconnaissance groups and mobile officer observations posts were readied for actions in breaking through the main line. Similar posts were also set up in each corps and army. In addition, in each corps, one-two mobile reconnaissance detachments were prepared.

In order to mislead our reconnaissance on the composition of the men and equipment in the Berlin sector, the Nazi command carried out a number of deception measures. The order of the commander of the 9th Army, Inf Gen Busse, of 3 March 1945 stated: "The General Staff of the Ground Army has ordered that deception be carried out in the aim of leading the enemy to think that there are large formations between the Oder and Berlin and these are the operational reserves of the 9th Army." For this reason "it must appear that: a) the Berlin Tank Corps is part of the Silesia and Potsdam divisions; b) the Brandenburg Tank Corps is part of the Havel and Spree divisions; c) to feign the arrival of the 10th Tank Division which has supposedly been newly organized in Berlin and its subordination to the Berlin Tank Corps."[4]

For conducting deception, the Nazis deployed a radio network and made extensive use of dummy tanks. With the aid of the latter they simulated the moving of military equipment by rail and the dep'oyment of it "in concentration areas."

It must be pointed out that initially the deception was successful, but was quickly and completely unmasked. The reconnaissance bodies of the front which operated in the enemy rear discovered that the platform cars were transporting not tanks but rather models. Somewhat later, from prisoner information it was established that trains with dummy tanks were being constantly made up at the Berlin railroad stations.[5]

Thus, the integrated use of the resources of all types of reconnaissance, including our agents, and the careful studying and comparison of the data secured by them made it possible to simultaneously nullify the Nazi deception, and by the start of the operation detect the true composition of the Nazi troop grouping deployed in the zone of the pending offensive of the front, as well as study in detail the defensive system the depth of which reached 100 km. The high effectiveness in the activities of the reconnaissance bodies of the front in detecting the enemy grouping during the preparatory period was fully substantiated in the course of the operation.[6]

Reconnaissance in breaking through enemy defenses. The going over of the troops of the front to a general offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force which started on 14 April. For conducting it, from each division one or two rifle battalions were assigned with tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts [SAU]. On the secondary sectors, reconnaissance in force was carried out by reinforced rifle companies. In 2 days, these subunits succeeded in a number of sectors in driving into the enemy positions to a depth of up to 2-4 and in some places 5 km. As a result, a clearer picture was gained of the enemy grouping and the system of its defenses in the first line, its integrity was breached, and the firing plan disrupted. The analysis of the results of the reconnaissance in force necessitated the making of a number of changes in the operational plan. In particular, the duration of the artillery softening up for the attack by the main forces was shortened from 30 to 20-25 minutes.

It is important to emphasize that the enemy was confused by our reconnaissance bodies. The author of these lines, after the capture of Berlin, participated in the interrogation of the chief of staff of the LVI Tank Corps, Col von Dufwing, who pointed out that the leadership of the corps, like that of the 9th Army, after the actions of the reconnaissance subunits, expected the main forces of the Soviet troops to go over to the offensive. But when this did not happen either on 14 or 15 April, it decided that a general offensive would not begin at all in the near future, since our command had decided that the German defenses were insurmountable. For this reason, the offensive by the main forces of the front on 16 April was unexpected for the Nazis

During the period of the breakthrough of the main defensive zone and the exploitation of the offensive, reconnaissance had the following basic missions: to follow the maneuvers of the enemy reserves on the battlefield and the commitment of them to the engagement, to clarify the direction and time of approach to the frontline of new enemy units which had been shifted from other sections and from the rear, as well as the Berlin defensive system and the measures of the Nazi command to reinforce the city's defenses.[7]

In carrying out these missions, operational reconnaissance was carried out by the observation and actions of reconnaissance groups and detachments, as well as officer reconnaissance patrols and other bodies. Observation was carried out by the mobile observation posts (PNP) directly in the infantry battle formations. In the area of each first-echelon division, one-two PNP were deployed, two-three PNP in a corps, and from three to seven PNP in an army. A majority of them was supplied with radios. For this reason the results of the observation were immediately transmitted to the direct superiors.

An important role in the obtaining of data was also played by the reconnaissance groups (RG), the separate reconnaissance patrols and the reconnaissance detachments (RO). In operating ahead of their troops and on the flanks and penetrating in the enemy positions, they not only carried out purely reconnaissance missions, but also destroyed crossings over water obstacles, sabotaged communications lines, and also destroyed small enemy groups. For example, on the very first day of the offensive from the 27th Guards Rifle Division (Commander, Maj Gen V. S. Glebov), a RG was dropped in the enemy rear under the command of Jr Lt Popov, and in the area to the south of Seelow this RG established the configuration of the forward edge of the second defensive line, and by a surprise attack captured 16 soldiers and 1 officer who provided valuable information. The RO of the 8th Guards Army under the leadership of Sr Lt N. A. Shevchenko blew up two bridges in the enemy rear, damaged 10 km of communications cable, captured 12 prisoners and destroyed 50 Nazi soldiers and officers.[8]

Having been defeated in the battles for the main line, the Nazi commander made every effort to hold the second defensive line which run along the Seelow Hills which rose 40 meters above the Oder Valley. From them the enemy could survey and correct the firing of its artillery and mortars deep in the battle formations of our troops.

At the same time, for the advancing troops, observation of the enemy was extremely difficult due to the thick greenery of the woods and orchards. For this reason, officer air reconnaissance was widely used during the fierce battle for the hills. I remember that Col Gen V. I. Chuykov ordered me (at that time an officer of the intelligence section on the staff of the 8th Guards Army) to fly out on an U-2 aircraft over the enemy positions and clarify the direction of the Nazi tanks which were moving up to the breakthrough area, while the worker of the operations section, Maj A. I. Velichko (also from the air), was to clarify the line of contact between the troops of the army and the Nazis. We established the bringing up of the Muncheberg Tank Division to the forward edge in the region of Golzow. The obtained data on the same day (16 April) were substantiated also by prisoners. Moreover, the sector of the committing to battle of the 169th Infantry Division was clarified.

It is essential to point out that the carrying out of assignments of the command involving a trip to the forward edge or the penetrating into the enemy rear by officers from the staffs of the formations and field forces during the war years was a common phenomenon. For example, the officers in operational reconnaissance from the staff of the front during the period of preparing for the Berlin Operation "crept across" literally the entire forward edge, checking the activities of the reconnaissance bodies. This made it possible to issue special directives where specific missions were assigned to eliminate detected shortcomings in each army.

Over the first 5 days of the operation, according to the data of our intelligence, the Nazis moved up from the reserves and shifted from other sectors 11 divisions and brigades which were committed to battle on the axis of the main thrust of the front in the zones of the 3d and 5th Assault armies and the 8th Guards Army. These data among other factors caused a change in the sector for committing the 2d Guards Tank Army to battle under Col Gen Tank Trps S. I. Bogdanov.

In the course of further observation of enemy actions, all types of reconnaissance noted that, beginning with the 6th day of the operation, the enemy sharply curtailed the committing of formations and units to battle. During the following 3 days, the Nazi command was able to activate an additional two divisions (the 156th Tank Training and the 3d Marines). At the same time, there was a marked rise in the number of special units and hurriedly organized volkssturm battalions which were committed to battle. From 21 through 23 April alone, the reconnaissance bodies of the formations and field forces of the front detected up to 80 tank battalions, while during the 5 previous days, the Nazis had committed only 45 to battle.[9]

Proceeding from the obtained data, the staff of the front drew the completely sound conclusion that the Nazi military leadership did not have sufficient forces for defending its capital, and its could use only the retreating formations of the 9th Army and the volkssturm units and subunits organized from the inhabitants of Berlin. For this reason, the plan of the operation was adjusted, and the command of the front took the decision to isolate the basic forces of the 9th Army from the Berlin grouping by encircling and destroying them in cooperation with the First Ukrainian Front (Commander, Mar SU I. S. Konev) in the woods to the southeast of Berlin. This was successfully carried out during the period from 24 April through 1 May.

Here reconnaissance also played a substantial role. Even during the second day of the encirclement (26 April) of the Frankfurt-Guben grouping where, in addition to the formations of the 9th Army, a portion of the troops of the 4th Tank Army had also been caught, our reconnaissance bodies established that the command of the enemy grouping had been ordered to break out of the encirclement ring and to leave it in the direction of Halbe and Luckenwalde in the aim of linking up with the troops of the 12th Army operating to the southwest of Berlin.[10] However, promptly taken measures thwarted the attempt by the enemy to carry out this order.

On 25 April, the ring of encirclement closed around Berlin. And the reconnaissance bodies of all levels were confronted with the mission of clarifying the composition of the Nazi forces and equipment concentrated in the city and outside of it, as well as the enemy defensive system. This was basically carried out by operational reconnaissance. And the operations of the reconnaissance aviation were extremely difficult as a consequence of the fact that the city was covered with clouds of smoke and dust caused by the numerous fires and destruction. Along with all types of observation and the carrying out of ambushes and raids, there was also the extensive practice of sending reconnaissance groups into the positions of enemy troops. For example, the RG of the 207th Rifle Division (Division Commander, Col V. M. Asafov) successfully carried out this mission. The group consisting of 16 persons penetrated into the Nazi rear, it established the location of guns in the strongpoint, and captured a prisoner. After interrogation at the division staff, the prisoner was sent back as our truce envoy. Through him the enemy was informed of the conditions for ceasing resistance. By evening the garrison of the strongpoint numbering 150 men, including 4 officers, had surrendered.[11]

A particular feature of observation in the city was the bringing of the observation posts to a distance of 100-200 meters away from the enemy and the positioning of them on the highest buildings and industrial works. Missions were assigned to reconnaissance not by sectors, as was usually the case, but rather in terms of directions or individual installations.

Simultaneously with supporting the operations of the troops of the front to destroy the Berlin groupings, the reconnaissance bodies maintained constant observation over the troop formations which had been concentrated beyond the city limits, and particularly those which could be used for breaking the ring of encirclement.

The broad scale of activities carried out by operational reconnaissance on the front can be seen from the fact that during the period of preparing for and conducting the operation, it carried out 2,956 reconnaissance measures, including: 109 reconnaissances in force, 1,284 sweeps, 507 ambushes, 83 sendings of reconnaissance groups into the enemy rear and the setting out of 973 mobile observations posts in the battle formations of the front echelon units. And 23,457 prisoners were taken and 2,157 documents captured.[12]

The operational troops also played an exceptionally important role in securing intelligence data. Being in direct contact with the enemy, the commanders of the units and subunits established reliable information on the enemy forces and the nature of operations, on the flanks, boundary areas between units, defensive works, obstacles, minefields, and so forth.

Thus, the experience of the Berlin Operation, like other ones, clearly shows the importance of operational reconnaissance for preparing and conducting combat operations by a field force. And at present also noteworthy is the fact that in this operation there was developed such previously noted trends as the centralization of control, the desire to conduct reconnaissance in the entire zone and to the entire depth of the operation in concentrating basic efforts in the sector of the main thrust, the constant interaction of all types of reconnaissance in terms of place, time and missions (objectives) and their integrated use, the assigning of significant forces for sweeps and for creating a dense network of observation in the zone of the front, the wide use of reconnaissance in force, and the involvement of not only reconnaissance aircraft but also combat aviation for conducting air reconnaissance.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the commander, for defeating a rapidly maneuvering enemy to the entire depth of its operational formation, should promptly receive the appropriate data. In other words, he must have highly effective means of reconnaissance which provide an opportunity, on the one hand, in the shortest period of time to detect the objectives (targets), to correctly identify them and determine the position (coordinates) with an accuracy that ensures the best use of the weapons, and on the other, to guarantee the processing of the reconnaissance information and immediately supply it to the interested parties. This is why the experience of the Berlin Operation is important in the assigning of zones of responsibility to the various means of reconnaissance, and the establishing of the degree of detailing the objectives to be determined and the times for reporting on them.

It is quite apparent that a study and generalization of the rich and diverse experience of organizing and conducting reconnaissance in the Berlin and other operations of the Great Patriotic War and the creative application of it in the training of the troops, staffs and reconnaissance bodies can and should contribute to raising their combat readiness.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Berlinskaya Operatsiya 1945 Goda" [The Berlin Operation of 1945], Voyenizdat, 1950, p 66.

[2][Not in text.]

[3]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 233, inv. 355817, file 1, sheet 324.

[4]Ibid., inv. 2352, file 91, sheet 14.

[5]Ibid., sheet 16.

[6]Ibid., sheet 17.

[7]Ibid., file 92, sheet 35.

[8]Ibid., file 91, sheet 48.

[9]Ibid., sheet 31.

[10]Ibid., sheet 52.

[11]Ibid., sheet 55.

[12]Ibid., sheet 60.

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10272
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WARTIME OPERATIONS: ORGANIZATION OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col V. Gorbunov: "Trends in the Development of the Organizational Structure of Air Defense Troops"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Air Defense Troops, together with the other armed services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops, were able to ensure the reliable defense of the most important rear facilities and provide cover for the troop groupings, various installations and lines of communications in the front area against air strikes. During the war, these troops underwent substantial organizational development.

The organizational changes were aimed at broadening their capabilities, improving the use of the existing resources, and raising the efficiency of control and the effectiveness of cooperation with the other armed services and branches of troops.

The improvement in the organizational structure of the Air Defense Troops depended upon a number of factors: upon the overall operational-strategic situation and the missions being carried out by the air defense troops; upon the employed methods and forms of combat operations; the quantitative and qualitative growth of the troops and military equipment; the changes in the nature of the air enemy's operations. The article analyzes only certain, in our view, most fundamental development trends in the organizational structure of the Air Defense Troops during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

If the given process is viewed as a whole, the main trend consists in the desire to create an air defense system which would provide effective defense for the troops on the battlefield as well as the rear facilities of the nation.

The air defenses of our nation were organized considering the probable nature of enemy air operations both against the troops on the battlefield as well as facilities deep in the rear which could be reached by enemy aviation. This zone had a depth up to 500-600 km along the western state frontier. It included up to 90 percent of the antiaircraft artillery and virtually all the fighter aviation assigned for carrying out air defense missions. In the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense there was the Main Air Defense Directorate which was in charge of the questions of overall planning, accounting, weapons and combat training of the Air Defense Troops.

In the border military districts, air defense zones were organized and these were headed by deputy district commanders for air defense. Within the organizational structure of a military district there was a headquarters of the air defense zone. The troops of the air defense zone included the air defense formations and units which directly carried out the combat missions of defending the cities and installations on the territory of the given zone.

However, the organic antiaircraft artillery which was part of the combined-arms formations on the level of the corps, divisions and brigades, was not subordinate to the air defense zones. The fighter aviation assigned from the Air Force for air defense of the most important centers of the nation (40 fighter aviation regiments) also was not part of the zones.

Thus, it was essential to allocate a grouping of air defense troops for protecting installations in the deep rear against air strikes, to reinforce the grouping and create central headquarters bodies. In this regard, a search was started for an air defense structure which would make it possible to fully utilize the combat capabilities of the Air Defense Troops.

In the autumn of 1941, on the basis of a decree of the USSR GKO [State Defense Committee] of 9 November, the entire air defense system was divided into organic and national territorial, and a commander was appointed for the National Air Defense Troops (he was the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Air Defense), and the appropriate headquarters bodies were created, including: staff, the headquarters of air defense fighter aviation, and the Main National Air Defense Directorate. In actuality a new armed service was created, the National Air Defense Troops.

The necessity of defending the administrative centers, the industrial zones and other major installations in the rear against mass enemy air strikes also led to the creation of operational field forces. The air defense zones organized in 1940, in essence, were not operational field forces capable of fully carrying out independent missions on the operational sectors.

In August 1941, the headquarters of a number of air defense zones (Northern, Northwestern, Kiev and Southern) were broken up, and the formations and units put directly under the commanders of the corresponding fronts. In November 1941, the air defense zones which had existed on the territory of the European USSR were abolished, and on the basis of them the corps and divisional air defense regions were set up, and in April 1942, the Moscow Air Defense Front[1] and the Leningrad Air Defense Army were organized. In Leningrad and Baku (where an air defense army was organized somewhat later), air defense armies existed until the end of the war.

In individual sectors of the front, the situation necessitated the operational subordination of certain air defense fronts and armies to the military councils of the fronts in order to provide a unity of troop leadership (Leningrad, Transcaucasia, Far East and Transbaykal Area). Thus, in 1941, at Leningrad all the air defense resources of varying subordination (the air defenses of the ground forces, naval air defenses, and the National Air Defense Troops) operating in this one zone, by a decision of Hq SHC [Headquarters, Supreme High Command] were made completely subordinate to the commander of the Leningrad Front.

Thus, even at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War there was a search for creating a unified air defense system also on an operational-strategic scale.

After the incorporation of the fighter aviation units and formations as part of the corps and divisional air defense regions in November 1941, the opportunity arose to cover not only individual points but also entire industrial areas against enemy air strikes. Thus, in the defense of Moscow, a zone of operations of air defense personnel and equipment was organized and the forward lines of this ran 200-250 km away from the capital. In actuality the entire Moscow industrial region was covered against enemy air strikes.

The necessity of reliable defense of the industrial installations against air strikes led to a situation where Hq SHK was forced to put the fighter air units allocated for air defense under the commander of the National Air Defense Troops, and on the spot, under the commanders of the corps and divisional air defense regions (the Order of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] of 22 January 1942). For the support of the air defense fighter aviation, 56 airfield maintenance battalions were allocated putting them under the commanders of the appropriate air corps, divisions and individual regiments. In essence, this became an organizational formation of a new branch of troops, the air defense fighter aviation.

In the organic air defenses, there also existed a tendency to create resources capable of successfully covering the ground forces against massed enemy air strikes and the centralizing of their control.

As a result of the dividing of the air defense resources into organic and the National Air Defense Troops, the situation became more complicated in providing cover for the ground forces. The air defense command of the fronts had at its disposal only certain units from the former air defense zones, as well as the former corps antiaircraft artillery battalions (after the abolishing of the corps level) which were part of the RGK High Command Reserves resources and operated under the leadership of the corresponding artillery chiefs. Thus, as a consequence of the sharp numerical reduction of antiaircraft artillery on the front, the possibilities of organizing reliable air defense for the troops were reduced. At the same time, central bodies of organic air defenses were lacking. Under these conditions, a decision was taken to put the air defense troops of the fronts under the artillery commander of the Soviet Army. By an order of the NKO of 2 June 1942, all the land air defense units and formations which had operated as part of the fronts were put under the artillery chief of the Soviet Army and, respectively, the artillery chiefs of the fronts and armies.

The first army air defense regiments also began to be organized. In June 1942, in the Soviet Army, over 3-score army air defense regiments, were formed, and by November their number had risen up to 104. In addition, upon the order of the NKO of 31 October 1942, antiaircraft artillery divisions of the RGK began to be organized as a resource of Hq SHK designed for covering the troop formations and field forces against air strikes and for the massed use of the antiaircraft artillery on the main sectors of troop operations.

While the creation and use of the army air defense regiments was the first step on the way to massing antiaircraft artillery fire, the forming of the antiaircraft artillery divisions marked the next step in this direction. Already in November

1942, the divisions for the first time participated in battles against the fascist aviation.

The organization of the artillery units was also improved, and individual regiments of medium- and small-caliber antiaircraft artillery were organized. Various subunits (antiaircraft machine gun, searchlight, and so forth) were excluded from them. The organization of the regiments became more standardized. All of this helped to improve the quality of control over the combat operations of the units and to improve their combat use. Thus, in the antiaircraft artillery, the improvement of the organizational structure occurred along the lines of setting up uniform units and formations for the purpose of improving their fire capabilities.

Combat experience indicated that the organizational separation of air defense into organic and national territorial played a positive role, particularly in carrying out the mission of protecting major installations and industrial areas in the deep rear against air strikes. In the state an air defense system was organized which in fact consisted of two echelons, organic air defense and the National Air Defense Troops. At the same time, a number of shortcomings became apparent. In the course of the offensive operations of the Soviet Army in the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943, the organic air defense did not have sufficient men and equipment for providing a dependable cover for the troops. Moreover, at times a gap was formed between the two air defense systems and during an offensive this could reach up to 300 km. For a certain period of time a number of installations on the liberated territory was not covered against air strikes. In the summer of 1943, in repelling massed enemy air raids on Gor'kiy, Saratov and Yaroslavl', the cooperation was extremely poorly organized between the fighter aviation and the antiaircraft artillery of the fronts and the National Air Defense Troops. The formation of air defense troops under varying subordination also created difficulties in their supply, in organizing the deliveries of weapons, and so forth. These factors caused the development of a tendency to control all the air defense troops on a state-wide scale.

On 29 June 1943, the USSR GKO promulgated a decree the essence of which consisted in the breaking up of the directorate of the commander of the National Air Defense Troops which had existed since November 1941, and the troops themselves were put under the artillery commander of the Soviet Army. As was pointed out above, in June 1942, all the antiaircraft resources of the fronts with their headquarters bodies had been put under him. Here were created: the Central Staff of the Air Defense Troops, the Central Staff of Air Defense Fighter Aviation, the Main Air Defense Inspectorate, the Directorate for the Combat Training of Air Defense Troops, and the Central VNOS [Aircraft Warning Service] Post. In the aim of ensuring concrete leadership over the national air defense resources, headquarters were organized for two air defense fronts, the Western and Eastern.

Thus, instead of the two different air defense control systems (for the national territory and the ground forces), in the summer of 1943, a system was set up for the control of all air defense troops. The artillery commander of the Soviet Army was entrusted, through the appropriate bodies, of controlling the actions of the National Air Defense Troops, leading the antiaircraft artillery formations and units of the fronts and the armies, as well as being concerned with the planning of weapons and manning the troops with rank-and-file and leadership personnel.

The unification of command of the National Air Defense Troops (including the fighter aviation) and the air defense troops of the fronts made it possible to utilize more rationally the air defense units and formations, and exclude the tieing up of resources at installations which were unreachable for the enemy, and ensured a broader maneuvering of them behind the advancing troops for sharply strengthening air defenses on the basic operational and strategic axes and the closer cooperation with the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts. From 10 through 30 September 1943, the commanders of the Western and Eastern air defense fronts moved 114 units and subunits for defending installations on liberated territory, and this included 10 medium-caliber artillery regiments, 4 small-caliber antiaircraft artillery regiments, 3 antiaircraft machine gun regiments, 15 fighter air regiments, 26 separate armored trains, and so forth.[7] This made it possible to provide cover for such major cities as Smolensk, Bryansk, Orel, Khar'kov, Poltava, Taganrog, and Novorossiysk, certain railroad junctions and 35 rail stations which supplied the fronts.

An opportunity appeared for a more coordinated solution to the questions of the cooperation of the National Air Defense Troops with the antiaircraft artillery and fighter aviation of the fronts. The essence of this consisted in a coordinated formation of the groupings of air defense resources, the organizing of reconnaissance against the air enemy, the exchanging of information on the air situation, and the joint planning of combat operations. An example of such precise cooperation was the air blockade of the enemy garrison in Breslau (Wroclaw) from 24 April through 6 May 1945, and this was carried out by the antiaircraft artillery of the X Air Defense Corps and the 173d Fighter Air Regiment of the 256th Fighter Air Division under the 2d Air Army of the First Ukrainian Front according to the principle of dividing up the zones of combat.

It is equally important to emphasize that on a state-wide scale, a three-echelon formation of air defense troops was created: the air defense formations and units of the fronts comprised the first echelon; the national air defense formations which were defending installations in the rear of the front were the second; the national air defense formations defending installations in the rear of the nation were the third. Such an echeloning of the resources made it possible to counter the air enemy more efficiently.

In the air defense fronts and armies, control of all the air defense resources (fighter aviation, antiaircraft artillery, the VNOS units, and so forth) was also concentrated in a single entity. The unity of command ensured precise coordination of the actions of the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery, the allocating of missions among them and the organization of cooperation. The areas of operations of the fighter aviation began to be more strictly coordinated with the zones of artillery fire, and fighter aviation was more widely used on the distant approaches to the installations, while the national air defense formations of the fronts (armies) were more closely coordinated with the antiaircraft artillery and fighter aviation of the fronts.

The air battles and engagements of the fighter aviation, in repelling raids on major installations, were now unified by a single concept and plan with centralized control, and began to assume individual traits of air defense operations (the repelling of massed raids on the Kursk railroad junction in the summer of 1943).

In the course of the offensive, a better solution was provided to the questions related to eliminating the gap between the organic air defenses and the National Air Defense Troops. For this units and formations were allocated from the national troops for providing cover of the frontline communications and installations in the rear of the front. Thus, the antiaircraft artillery of the organic air defenses gained an opportunity to focus virtually all resources on providing a cover for the basic troop groupings. But as the scope of the offensive operations increased in 1944, it became apparent that the Western Air Defense Front alone could not successfully handle its missions. The Eastern Air Defense Front which brought together the troops defending installations deep in the rear was not conducting active operations. Moreover, the existence of a demarcation line between the Western and Eastern Air Defense fronts from north to south limited the maneuvering of air defense resources which could be used for providing a cover for installations in the combat zone. The National Air Defense Troops, on an even broader scale than in 1943, were confronted with the task of ensuring air defenses for the rear lines of communications of the advancing fronts and the prompt organizing of defenses for major centers on the territory liberated from the enemy.

For improving the use of the National Air Defense Troops, the USSR GKO on 29 March 1944, approved a decree on the creation of three air defense fronts--the Northern, Southern and Transcaucasian--on the basis of the troops of the Western and Eastern Air Defense fronts, as well as the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone. In terms of its purpose and place in the overall structure of the Soviet Army, the air defense fronts were operational-strategic field forces the importance of which was determined by the following factors. In the first place, they were entrusted with the missions of defending key strategic national installations. Secondly, they at the same time covered installations on certain operational sectors, since each front cooperated with several fronts of the Soviet Army. This reorganization made it possible to carry out broader maneuvering of the resources for providing a cover for installations on liberated territory. For example, in May-June 1944, two fighter air divisions and more than 40 antiaircraft artillery units were moved up from the rear regions of the Southern Air Defense Front into the combat zone. In the second half of 1944, 25 various units were transferred from the Transcaucasian Air Defense Front to reinforce other air defense fronts.[3]

As the Soviet troops advanced to the west, the territories of the Northern and Southern Air Defense fronts rapidly broadened. A number of the national air defense formations was operating in the liberated areas of the Baltic, Western Belorussia, Poland, Romania and Hungary. In the interests of the offensive operations being conducted, it was essential to ensure the greatest efficiency in their control and provide the closest cooperation with the antiaircraft artillery and fighter aviation of the front. For this reason the USSR GKO, in the decree of 24 December 1944, again altered the organizational structure of the National Air Defense Troops. In the European USSR and in Transcaucasia, four air defense fronts were organized: the Western, Southwestern, Central and Transcaucasian (which remained unchanged). This made it possible to provide an air cover for all the most important strategic sectors.

The breaking up of the air defense fronts significantly increased the efficiency of troop control and provided closer cooperation between the troops and the fronts. Instances of delays in organizing air defense for the frontline lines of communications and installations on territory liberated from the enemy virtually did not reoccur.

In March 1945, according to the decree of the GKO, three armies, the Maritime, Amur and Transbaykal, were organized on the basis of the Transbaykal and Far Eastern air defense zones for strengthening air defenses for installations in Siberia and the Far East.

After the organizational changes of 1944-1945, there were four air defense fronts and five air defense armies on Soviet territory.

Thus, the basic trend in the organizational changes in the operational-strategic level of the National Air Defense Troops was also a move toward centralized control, and for this large field forces of the front or army type were created. This tendency was caused by the greater role played by the National Air Defense Troops in the course of the armed combat, by the increase and broadening of the range of their missions, and by the necessity of massing resources for providing defense against air strikes for major centers in the rear and close cooperation with the fighter aviation and antiaircraft artillery of the fronts in the aim of covering the troop groupings, the front (army) rears, and organizing air defenses for facilities on liberated territory. We must note the pioneering of our Armed Forces in forming operational-strategic field forces, the air defense fronts. This is one of the examples of a creative approach to organizational measures carried out in the years of the war, and proof of the advanced nature of Soviet military art.

The structure of the air defense troops was also improved on the operational-tactical level. In April 1944, in the National Air Defense Troops, all the corps and divisional air defense regions were transformed into air defense corps and divisions with the assigning of numbers to them. An air defense corps, as a rule, operated in an area of one or another front, and carried out missions together with the air defense formations (units) of the fronts. The air defense corps also successfully cooperated with the fighter aviation of the fronts (the Budapest, Vienna, Prague and other operations).

The tables of organization and equipment for the air defense corps were not permanent. The number of units in them was determined by the importance of the missions confronting them. The air defense corps, in having fighter aviation units, could carry out missions independently or in cooperation with the other air defense formations, as well as with the air defense forces of the fronts. Such an organization proved fully effective during the war.

Thus, a trend in the changes in the operational-tactical level was the creation of air defense formations of the combined-arms type. These changes were necessitated by the integrated use of the resources of the various branches of troops. In the air defense fighter aviation, after the GKO decree of 29 June 1943, one operational field force was created (the First Air Defense Air Army), there was an increase in the number of air formations (corps and divisions), and the organization of the fighter air units continued to be improved. In the antiaircraft artillery, from the autumn of 1943, eight-gun batteries were organized which were synchronized with the gun laying stations. The creation of eight-gun batteries and the formation of antiaircraft regiments and artillery divisions provided a high density of antiaircraft fire and its massing. Under the conditions of repelling raids by large enemy air forces, this was very important.

For covering the forward airfields of the air armies, in 1943, 34 airfield air defense regiments were organized consisting of three small-caliber antiaircraft artillery batteries and two antiaircraft machine gun companies in each. Subsequently a trend was observed toward increasing the antiaircraft weapons in the air armies. Thus, in March 1944, the 17th Air Army (Commander, Gen V. A. Sudets), in addition to the fighter aviation units, had three TOE airfield air defense regiments, four attached antiaircraft artillery RGK regiments, and antiaircraft machine gun companies of the airfield maintenance battalions. In March 1944, the position was established of the air defense chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army with a small staff under him for providing leadership over the air defense service.[4]

Characteristic for the development of the VNOS troops was: the rise of radar troops; the creation of subunits equipped with radars for guiding fighter aviation; the formation of radio battalions with the aim of rapidly deploying the VNOS system on liberated territory.

The other national air defense resources also underwent definite organizational development during the past war.

In the organic air defenses there was a process of improving the troop control bodies and increasing the number of antiaircraft artillery units and formations. Thus, by the start of 1944, each of the fronts had an average of 5-7 antiaircraft artillery divisions and up to 10 separate RGK regiments and battalions. By the start of 1945, this quantity had increased up to 9-12 and 10-15, respectively.

Thus, the Great Patriotic War showed that for successful combating of large masses of enemy aviation, it was essential to have the following: in the first place, a unified air defense system in which the organic air defenses and the National Air Defense Troops were component parts; secondly, centralized leadership over all the air defense resources; thirdly, an organizational structure which would correspond to the nature and content of armed combat at one or another stage of the war.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The Moscow Air Defense Front in the summer of 1943 was reorganized into the Separate Moscow Air Defense Army.

[2]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 72, inv. 12310, file 382, sheets 58-59.

[3]"Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony Strany. Istoricheskiy Ocherk" [The National Air Defense Troops. Historical Essay], Voyenizdat, 1968, p 277.

[4]TsAMO, folio 327, inv. 102981, file 1, sheets 202-203; folio 35, inv. 162321, file 12, sheet 23; folio 370, inv. 113768, file 7, sheet 62.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN AN OFFENSIVE

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[Article published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War" by Chief of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transport, Docent, Col Gen K. Abramov: "Some Aspects of Rear Services Support in Offensive Operations of the Third Period of the War"; passages in italics printed in boldface]

[Text] In the operations of the previous war, the Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces carried out a colossal amount of work and demonstrated high combat capability, tenacity and flexibility. They were an inseparable part of the troops, and in the organization of rear services support, one of the most important areas of Soviet military art.

The forms and methods of carrying out the diverse and complicated tasks of troop supply in each operation had, as is known, specific features. At the same time a number of common principles can be established in the preparation and operation of the rear services. In analyzing them, it is possible to isolate the most characteristic aspects which are not only of important historical and theoretical but also practical significance. The present article briefly examines certain, most typical questions of rear services support for the troops during operations during the third period of the war.

Composition, grouping and formation of operational rear services. In the offensive operations during the third period of the war, the operational rear services assumed the most fully organized structure, its composition and technical equipping rose substantially, and the principles of the grouping and formation were clearly defined in the preparations for and in the course of operations.

In line with the significant increase in the effective combat strength and technical equipping of the troops (the effective combat strength of the fronts increased by 4-6-fold for tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery mount], by 4-5-fold for artillery, and 4-8-fold for aircraft),[1] and the greater scope and dynamicness of the offensive operations (the depth of the strategic operations increased by 2-2.5-fold and reached 550-600 km; the rate of advance increased from 8-10 to 20-30 and sometimes 45-50 km per day), the logistical requirements of the troops increased sharply during the third period. And this, in turn, was the basic reason for a further broadening of the composition of the army and particularly the front rear services, for the increase in their size and the greater equipping with motor vehicle, road

and other special equipment. While, for example, during operations of the second period of the war the front rear services had an average of 200-250 rear units and facilities, in 1944-1945, their number in the fronts fighting on the main axes rose up to 450-500, and in the armies, respectively, from 70-80 to 90-100.

There was a corresponding rise in the total number of personnel and the technical equipping of the rear services. Thus, on 1 January 1945, the number of railroad troops, in comparison with 1941, had increased by 2.8-fold,[2] for the motor vehicle troops by 4.1-fold, and for the road troops by 51.5-fold; the number of vehicles in the motor transport units was 78,730 (a rise of 3.15-fold). While in 1943, in the fronts there were 5 motor vehicle regiments, 195 separate motor vehicle battalions and 15 separate motor vehicle companies, in January 1945, there were 34 motor vehicle regiments, 173 separate motor vehicle battalions and more than 30 separate motor vehicle companies.[3]

The experience of the war convincingly affirmed two important principles. In the first place, the composition and capabilities of all levels of rear services should fully conform to the effective combat strength and missions of the supported troops. Secondly, only with the correct grouping of the rear units and facilities, with the prompt and flexible maneuvering of the available resources, could the continuity, necessary mobility and stability of rear services support for the troops be achieved.

The command and headquarters bodies for the rear services of the fronts and armies, in utilizing the experience of the previous operations, precisely carried out these demands. In creating the groupings and in organizing the rear services, they fully adhered to the *major principle which was accepted at that time of concentrating the basic resources in the sector of the main thrust of the front (army) and the bringing of them decisively closer to the supported troops.* For example, in the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder, East Prussian, Berlin and other operations, at least 65-70 percent of the frontal supply depots and the rail, motor transport, road, medical, repair and other rear services units and facilities was deployed and operated in the sector of the main thrust. Such a concentrating of the basic rear services resources contributed to their autonomy, and made it possible to intensify efforts and continuously supply the assault groupings to the entire depth of the operations.

The frontal rear services units and facilities in the jump-off position were deployed, as a rule, in two or three echelons, and the first and second echelons were brought as close as possible to the troops. The first echelon (the squads of the field depots with supplies of ammunition and fuel, and a portion of the mobile hospitals) was deployed 20-30 km from the forward edge, the second echelon (the basic portion of the resources of the frontal rear) was 50-80 km, and the third (dressing stations, individual dumps, medical, repair and certain other facilities) 150-200 and more kilometers. Up to 80 percent of the total combat strength of the frontal rear was deployed in the first and second echelons.[4]

The army rear services units and facilities were also echeloned in depth. In the jump-off position, their basic men and equipment were deployed 25-40 km behind the forward edge in the area of the army supply stations and partially (individual medical and repair-evacuation facilities) in the troop rear services area, in immediate proximity to the troops. In a majority of the units, particularly the medical ones, was packed up at the jump-off point, ready to follow behind the troops. During this period the missions of the army rear services were carried out by the frontal rear services units and facilities deployed in the first echelon.

Such an organization of the operational rear services conformed best to the nature of the operations being conducted and to the conditions of the operational-strategic situation during the third period of the war, and made it possible to utilize the basic rear services resources on the main, decisive sectors and to promptly increase them from the rear without falling behind the rapidly advancing assault groupings of the fronts.

In the course of the rapid exploitation of the offensive, the rear bodies of the fronts and armies were often confronted with complicated tasks in carrying out immediate maneuvers with the available resources and promptly bringing the depot squads with the supplies of ammunition and fuel, the hospitals, the repair-evacuation and other essential rear units and facilities closer to the troops. The successful solution to them was achieved by a range of organizational and technical measures, including: the correct selection of the routes and the orgnization of reconstruction on the railroads and military highways (VAD) along the broad front, by the rapid deployment of transshipping bases (reloading areas), by the effective use of the Western European gauge railroads for delivery and evacuation, by the allocating of a motor transport reserve, by the flexible maneuvering of it with abrupt changes in the situation, and by using organic motor transport, and in difficult conditions, the first line vehicles and tractors for delivering ammunition and fuel from the army and front depots or their squads.

The integrated and organized execution of these measures made it possible to move up the necessary rear resources basically promptly, and to continuously supply the advancing troops. An instructive example could be, for example, the maneuvering of materiel supplies, the medical and transport units and facilities of the First Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder Operation. Thus, for repelling the strong counterthrust being prepared by the enemy from Pomerania, upon a decision of the commander of the front, four combined-arms and two tank armies were quickly regrouped to the right wing. The front rear services bodies, in utilizing the reserve of motor transport, the medical and transport units and facilities, as well as the rebuilt and intact Western gauge railroad sections, were able to quickly and promptly shift the necessary supplies to the new sector. Over the 5 days, the motor transport of the Headquarters Reserve and the front supplied the armies with more than 7,000 tons of ammunition, while the medical service deployed 15,000 hospital beds. As a total, from 23 January through 10 February 1945, the right wing of the front received from the rear services around 170 trains with various materiel, including over 20,000 tons of ammunition.[5]

Characteristic in the work of the operational rear services was *rear services support for the mobile groups of the armies and fronts*. In advancing rapidly into the operational depth of enemy defenses, the mobile troops cut up the enemy groupings and created good conditions for their complete defeat and the successful concluding of the operations.

The mobile groups of the armies (as a rule, a tank, mechanized or cavalry corps with reinforcement units) and the mobile groups of the fronts (a tank army, sometimes separate tank and mechanized corps or a horse-mechanized group reinforced by formations and units of the artillery and special troops) required a great deal of fuel and ammunition. But the delivery of these supplies was very difficult due to the high rate of advance of the troops (up to 40-45 km a day, and on individual days up to 70 km and more) and the significant distance from the supply bases. For

increasing the logistical stability of the mobile groups, the rear services bodies of the fronts and armies carried out a number of special measures. Thus, in the jumping-off area in the formations and units which were part of mobile groups, increased supplies of fuel and ammunition were created ahead of time. Careful preparations were made for the organic and mobile part of the army rear services, that is, the depot squads with supplies of fuel and ammunition, the surgical hospitals, the repair-evacuation and other essential units and facilities. The remaining rear units and facilities of the tank armies remained in the area of the supply stations, and were moved, as a rule, after the rebuilding of the railroads. On open land as close as possible to the forward edge moved the squads of the front (army) depots with the supplies of fuel, ammunition and other materiel specifically for supplying the mobile groups. The fronts prepared a portion of the materiel for delivery by air. The front (army) motor transport was loaded up ahead of time with fuel and the required ammunition, and was kept ready for immediate advancement into the area of combat operations. Provost traffic control and sometimes combat subunits were assigned to accompany the vehicle columns.

In certain instances, for more flexible and dependable leadership over rear services support of the mobile columns in the fronts, special operational headquarters groups were organized. They included officers from the rear services staff and the headquarters of the basic supply and support services. Also put under them were the assigned motor transport with supplies, the road, medical and other mobile rear services units and facilities.

The carrying out of the designated measures proved fully effective and contributed to the uninterrupted support of the mobile groups.

Troop logistic support. The experience of the offensive operations convincingly affirmed the crucial role of the material base in achieving victory over the enemy. The tendency for an increase in the material requirements of the fronts (armies) depending upon an increase in the strength of the troops, the change in the nature and intensity of the combat missions carried out by them, was apparent in the third period of the war.

During the third period, the national economy was the basic source of logistic support for the troops of the fronts. The heroic working class and kolkhoz peasantry of the USSR achieved new successes in producing weapons, ammunition, fuel and food. The enormous material and technical resources of the nation were delivered in an unbroken flow to the operational army and navy, and were used along strictly centralized lines. Those fronts which were operating in active sectors and were carrying out the main missions in the offensive operations were supplied first and most fully.

The principle of rigid centralization and efficient use of ammunition, fuel and other materiel was fully observed also in the inferior levels, the operational and troop rear services. This made it possible in a comparatively short time to create the required supplies in the troops and at the army and front depots. For example, by the start of the Vistula-Oder Operation, the following had been stockpiled in the First Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts: from 3.1 to 5.5 and more ammunition loads for artillery rounds and mortars, 4.3-5.1 fuelings of gasoline, 3.4-4.6 fuelings of diesel fuel, and up to 14 fuelings of aviation fuel.[6] It must be emphasized that the material supplies on the fronts were created considering the full need of the troops to the entire depth of the operation.

In the operations great attention was given to the correct echeloning and the dependable protection of material supplies. In conducting an offensive at a rapid pace and to a great depth, *the echeloning of supplies was carried out according to the principle of the greatest possible approach of them to the forward edge.* This was achieved by creating increased supplies of ammunition and fuel in the troops, by laying in artillery rounds and mortar shells at the firing positions, by deploying army and front depots at the head railroad stations, and by bringing up a portion of the army and front depots (their squads) with supplies of materiel overland and directly to the troop rear areas. As a result of the measures carried out, up to 75-80 percent of all the available material resources of the fronts was concentrated in the troops some 20-70 km behind the forward edge. With an overall favorable operational-strategic situation, such echeloning of supplies proved effective and to a significant degree contributed to the uninterrupted support of the troops during their rapid advance.

In the offensive operations of the third period of the war, there was finally formulated and established *the most important principle of organizing the delivery of material forward, from the superior rear services element to the inferior one and directly to the troops with the full responsibility of the senior chiefs for prompt delivery.* The unswerving fulfillment of this principle made it possible for the commanders to give combat missions to their subordinates, in actually supplying them in material terms, and also contributed to the centralized and more efficient use of all types of transport. The rear services chiefs were able to use not only their own transport according to a unified plan, but also that of the inferior elements.

Rail transport played the main role in delivery on the front level. Freight was delivered by rail to the front depots, supply stations and unloading stations of the combined-arms, tank and air armies. Each army in the jump-off position was usually assigned two supply stations 20-40 km from the forward edge; the unloading stations were assigned as close as possible to the troops (3-5 km).

From the railroads, delivery to the troops was carried out by the front, army and organic motor vehicle and partially cart transport. Here the capabilities of motor transport rose substantially. While in the second period of the war, the capacity of motor transport for delivery in the fronts, as a rule, did not exceed 4,000-5,000 tons, and in the armies 250-300 tons, during the third period of the war it reached, respectively, 6,000-8,000 tons and 400-600 tons, and in the divisions 80-100 tons.

In the concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War, one can clearly note a tendency for a *decline in the role of rail transport in the operational rear, and the replacing of it by the more flexible, motor, air and pipeline.*

In the offensive operations, the bodies of the operational rear services carried out great work in preparing, rebuilding and technically supporting the railroads and military roads. Precisely in the third period of the war, the crucial role of the lines of communications was clearly affirmed in supporting the prompt maneuvering of the troops and the delivering of everything necessary to them for combat and life. A larger portion of all types of troop shipments was handled by the railroads which were the crucial element in the entire network of communications and the basis of the basing system of the fronts and armies.

The preparation, rebuilding and operation of frontal railroads. As experience showed, in the zone of the offensive of the fronts there should be at least two frontal railroad routes (a total capacity of 50-60 pairs of trains a day) and two or three lateral lines. Such a network provided an opportunity to promptly receive and handle the basic flow of operational, supply as well as evacuation shipments. The fronts could also prepare and organize dependable operation of one or two frontal distribution stations (FRS) and their branches, up to 15-20 front depot stations, 20-25 army supply stations and the needed number of unloading stations.

In the course of an offensive in the fronts, as a rule, two rail routes were rebuilt. One of them was the main one. Here was assigned the basic number of railroad troops and special formations of the front (up to 70-75 percent). The work was carried out to the entire depth, and this made it possible to increase the reconstruction rate. For example, in the First Ukrainian Front in January-February 1945, the basic rail route of Sandomir, Skarzysko-Kamienna and Czestochowa was rebuilt over a length of 300 km all at once with an average rate of up to 15 km per day, and on individual sections up to 20 km.

However the rate of rebuilding railroads as a whole and during the third period of the war lagged substantially behind the rate of troop advance. Thus, while the armies advanced 20-40 and sometimes up to 40-50 km a day, the average rate of rebuilding the rail routes usually was only 10-12 km a day. As a result, the supply bases were far removed from the forward units. The basic reason for such a low rate of railroad rebuilding was the large amount of destruction.

A reduction in the time for rebuilding the railroads was directly dependent upon the correct choice of the basic rail routes. The experience of the war convincingly showed that it was not beneficial to rebuild any shortest rail route. An analysis of the nature and amount of possible destruction in a number of instances suggested that it would be better to rebuild first the longer sections. An instructive example of this was the decision of the military council of the First Belorussian Front to rebuild the railroad on the route Kalinkovichi, Zhlobin, Bobruysk, Osipovichi, Baranovichi and Zhabinka, although it was almost 108 km longer than the shortest (Kalinkovichi, Luninets, Zhabinka). The problem was that several-fold less destruction, particularly of bridges, was expected on it. In the course of the operation, the soundness of the taken decision was fully affirmed.

An important task of the rear services of the fronts and armies in the concluding operations of the war was the organizing of the efficient use of the Western European gauge railroads. First of all the question had to be determined of whether to alter them to the Soviet gauge or be satisfied with transloading the freight at the transloading bases being deployed.

After a thorough examination of both versions, it was considered best on each front to alter one rail route to the Soviet gauge and use these for rapidly delivering the most essential materiel to the troops. The entire remaining railroad network would be operated without alteration. In this instance, specially created transloading bases and temporary transloading areas would be set up at the boundary points of the different-gauge sections. The railroads with Western European gauge were widely used not only by the fronts but also by the armies which frequently organized special rail shuttles for delivering freight on remote rail sections.

The rebuilding and maintenance of military roads. With the entry of Soviet troops onto Polish and German territory, the role of the VAD in the overall system of rear services support for the troops increased substantially. This was caused by the further increase on the fronts in the number of motor transport (by the beginning of 1945, each front had 60,000-70,000 motor vehicles, including 4,000-6,000 transport), by the significant lag of the supply bases behind the advancing troops, and by the good development of the road network here (for each 100 km^2 there were around 40 km of hard-surfaced roads).

In order to ensure the uninterrupted delivery, evacuation, the moving up of the troops and the carrying out of other military shipments, the fronts rebuilt and maintained two-three frontal roads and one-two lateral ones. The armies in the first echelon, in the preparations for and during the operations, had, as a rule, one or two military roads each. The frontal VAD ran from the areas of the FRS (the VAD of the Center) to the army supply stations. In the course of the operations, these were increased to the army depot squads overland, and the army VAD from the supply stations (the frontal VAD) to the depots of the formations. With such a relatively developed network of frontal and army VAD, the intensity of traffic, particularly in the sectors of the main thrusts, was rather high. For example, each day more than 20,000 motor vehicles traveled over the VAD of the First Belorussian Front between Kustrin (Kostrzyn) and Berlin.[7]

In the third period of the war, the sequence of work in rebuilding the VAD was clearly defined. Directly behind the advancing military units, the first (head) echelon of road troops moved up and carried out the primary work. It included army and mobile front units which together with the combat engineer and engineer subunits conducted reconnaissance, cleared minefields and temporarily rebuilt the roads, that is, ensured passage. Behind the head units came the front construction and provost traffic control units of the second echelon. These improved the quality of the roadway, they completed the reconstruction of bridges, they built additional accesses and fully organized the VAD.

For accelerating the rate of rebuilding the VAD on the fronts and in the armies, materials and bridge elements were manufactured ahead of time and delivered to the head sections. The road units in the jumping-off point were concentrated on the main sectors in a ready state, and were deployed as close as possible to the forward edge. In the course of the advance, the rebuilding of roads and the construction of bridges were carried out along a broad front. A higher rate of rebuilding the VAD was also aided by the increased technical equipping of the road troops and their close cooperation with the engineer troops and their joint execution of labor-intensive and difficult work. For example, in the course of building 18 bridges across the Vistula (on the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads), up to 40 percent of all the work was carried out by the engineer units and 60 percent by the road units.

Control of the rear services. The ordered centralized structure created during the war years for the control and command bodies of the rear services fully corresponded to the increased demands, and contributed to the successful carrying out of the practical missions. *It harmoniously combined one-man leadership in troop command and centralized leadership for troop rear services support.*

There was a substantial improvement in the cooperation of the rear services command bodies and the combined-arms staffs, the chiefs of the branches of troops, the

special troops and services. Practical skills were strengthened and the professional mastery of the officers of the rear staffs and services rose. All of this contributed to the firmer and more precise control and command of the rear services, and ultimately to the steadier operation of the entire system of rear services troop support.

In acquiring a good deal of experience in the course of the war, the deputy commanders, the staffs and the rear services of the fronts and the armies began to plan measures significantly better for the rear support of the troops. Here the basic ones were worked out to the entire depth of the operation, right up to its conclusion. The experience of the operations showed that after the troops had carried out the final missions, the intensity of combat operations not only did not decline, but, as a rule, increased due to the strong enemy counterstrikes. For this reason, the rear services support plans began to provide a reserve of materiel, transport, medical, road and other rear units and facilities designed specially for supporting troop combat operations to reinforce the achieved lines.

In order to keep the plan of the operation a secret, an overall plan for rear services support was not worked out in the fronts and the armies. The basic measures to organize rear services support for the troops were drawn up graphically on a map. The directive (order) for the rear services was given only directly before the start of the operation. The specific missions for the rear services bodies in the troops and the chiefs of the services in preparing the rear services and supplying the troops were given personally by the deputy commander and the chief of the rear services staff of the front (army).

Operational leadership over rear services support was provided in the course of an offensive by brief written and verbal instructions given personally or over the communications. Greater efficiency and clarity of control were significantly aided by the prompt familiarizing of the deputy commanders with the overall concept and plan of the operation, and their detailed knowledge of the operational-strategic situation and the expected prospects for its changes. This made it possible for them to predict the development of events and to promptly take the necessary measures to correct the rear services support of the troops. Experience showed that *the factor of prediction in the leadership of the rear services support system was of primary significance.*

Thus, the providing of steady and flexible leadership over the rear services in the operations was a diverse and complicated problem. *Only with clear and scientifically organized control could the uninterrupted rear services support of the troops be sustained, and, consequently, the successful carrying out of the combat missions in the operations by them.*

In the course of the offensive operations during the third period of the war, as is known, definite patterns and trends became apparent. Thus, particularly apparent was the very important principle of concentrating the basic resources of the rear services in the sector of the main thrust of the front (army) and the bringing of them as close as possible to the troops. The trend was firmly established of organizing the delivery of materiel forward, that is, from the superior rear services element to the inferior one, with the full responsibility of the senior chiefs for the prompt delivery of everything necessary for the subordinate troops. There was definitely a decline in the role of rail transport in the operational rear and

the replacing of it with more flexible types such as motor vehicle, air or pipeline.

As the experience of the war indicated, the structure of the rear headquarters bodies should be organized on the principle of one-man leadership and centralized leadership over rear services support. The deputy commanders for the rear services in the operational field forces were the main and fully empowered organizers in the rear services support of the troops. The factor of scientific prediction in directing the rear services support system of the troops assumed ever-greater significance in the operation of the rear services.

The experience gained by the troops in rear services support during the third period of the war, in a number of instances, has not lost its timeliness in our days. A profound study and correct use of it will contribute to a further improvement in the activities of the rear bodies, to a rise in their combat readiness and the effectiveness of operations under present-day conditions.

Combat experience must be studied creatively, in accord with the actual conditions for preparing for and conducting the operations. V. I. Lenin emphasized that "it is impossible to learn to carry out one's missions with new methods at present if yesterday's experience has not opened our eyes to the incorrectness of the old methods."[8] This fundamental Leninist concept should lie at the basis of all practical work in the area of further developing and improving the Soviet Armed Forces, including the rear bodies.

FOOTNOTES

[1]"Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [Soviet Armed Forces], Voyenizdat, 1978, p 347.

[2]TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio of the Railroad Troop Directorate, inv. 161872, file 9, sheet 1.

[3]Ibid., folio 67, inv. 20087, file 277, sheet 11; inv. 20088, file 465, sheet 15.

[4]"Tyl Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil v Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyne" [The Rear Services of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War], Voyenizdat, 1977, p 144.

[5]Ibid., p 148.

[6]Ibid., p 145.

[7]Ibid., p 287.

[8]V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 44, p 205.

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NAVAL FORCES: VISIT TO VIETNAM IN 1979 DESCRIBED

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[Article published under the heading "Memoirs" by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Capt 1st Rank V. Samarkin: "Among Our Vietnamese Friends"]

[Text] In November 1979, a detachment of ships from the Pacific Fleet consisting of the missile-carrying cruiser "Admiral Fokin," the large ASW ship "Skoryy," and the destroyer "Vozbuzhdennyy" under the command of the first deputy commander of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Adm N. Yasakov, visited the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In the history of the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples, this was the first official visit of fighting ships. It occurred during the days of celebrating the 62d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 1st anniversary of the day of signing the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. I happened to participate in it as a representative of the Navy Political Directorate.

We sailed out of Vladivostok on the missile-carrying cruiser "Admiral Fokin" which was to join up with the ships of the detachment in the South China Sea. Just before setting to sea, a meeting of the personnel was held on the poop of the cruiser. The commander of the detachment, Vice Adm N. Yasakov, reminded the sailors that the forthcoming visit would be an important contribution to the growing Soviet-Vietnamese friendship. It should show that fraternal cooperation between the USSR and Vietnam is carried out in all areas of social life, including the military. The commander of the detachment emphasized that the visit would occur in a difficult period, when the reactionary forces of the imperialist states headed by the United States were beginning a global offensive against detente, and were creating centers of tension in various regions of the world, including Southeast Asia.

Vice Adm N. Yasakov and the other speakers at the meeting spoke angrily about the recent Chinese aggression against the freedom-loving people of Vietnam. Encouraged by the U.S. imperialists and their allies, the Chinese hegemonists in February-March 1979 had attacked Vietnam. The Vietnamese people and their soldiers had dealt a decisive rebuff to the invaders.

The participants of the meeting, in profoundly understanding all the complexity of the international situation and the particular features of the forthcoming cruise, assured the command that they would honorably carry out the set mission.

The crossing of the Sea of Japan was comparatively calm. Life on the ship went on according to the established schedule. The commander, Capt 2d Rank A. Samofal, and his deputy for political affairs, Capt 3d Rank L. Beskaravaynyy, ably directed the activities of the crew and the party and Komsomol organizations. In the crew's quarters and the battle stations, intense work was underway. The sailors participated with great interest in talks, they listened to lectures on Vietnam, and became acquainted with the history of the Vietnamese people and their heroic struggle against foreign invaders. Symbolically, in the 13th century the Russian and Vietnamese peoples almost simultaneously began to fight against the common enemy of the Mongol-Tartar enslavers.

Upon instructions of the senior political worker of the detachment, Capt 1st Rank V. Semiletanko, around-the-clock duty was established for the political workers. They attended each instruction session and the going on watch of the personnel, they provided aid to the ship command in assigning the communists, party and Komsomol activists to the battle stations and departments, and among the communists of the cruise staff they created a party group which carried out active work among the sailors.

The personnel of the cruiser were always up on things. Every 4-6 hours, the radio broadcast brief information on the military-political situation in the given maritime area, and on events in our country and abroad. The cruiser had its own photographic bulletin OKEANSKIM KURSOM [By the Ocean Course] put out by the Navy Political Directorate for ships on long cruises.

On the 3d day of the crossing, early in the morning, according to the existing tradition, off of Tsushima Island, the crew of the ship was formed up on the poop in order to pay honor to the Russian sailors who perished here in 1905. The sailors, petty officers and officers who spoke at the meeting vowed to always be loyal to the glorious military traditions of the Russian Navy. They spoke about the necessity of raising combat readiness and vigilance, and always being on guard.

During the cruise, the exercises in political and military training did not halt for a single day. One of the political exercises was devoted to the military-political situation in Southeast Asia. Participating in it were the detachment commander, the assigned political workers and the officers of the cruise staff. In the course of the exercises, the personnel provided a correct assessment of the aggressive intrigues of the United States, the Beijing leadership and the reactionary forces of Japan in Southeast Asia.

In the South China Sea, a single political day was held with the participation of the detachment commander, the deputy commander for political affairs and the officers of the cruise staff.

On the 5th day of the voyage, the ship crew had to execute the difficult but already customary mission of passing over mail to a submarine which was on a long cruise. A meeting was held in the designated area. Here the process of handing over the mail took a little time. Although the sea was stormy, the rendezvous of the sub and ship was carried out normally. A line was thrown across from the cruiser and over this a bag with the mail in cellophane packaging was quickly transferred to the sub. The mission was seemingly not difficult, but it required a good deal of skill from the crew.

On the expanses of the South China Sea, the conditions of the cruise changed abruptly. The temperature rose up to 25° Celsius. It became difficult to breathe as the air was saturated with moisture. The nighttime sky was unusual, scattered with dully twinkling stars. At night, on the bridge, in the calm water the speed of the ship could not be felt. It seemed as if it was standing still. And all of a sudden there were hundreds of bright lights. These were fishing junks, small vessels with powerful generators. The bright light attracted the fish and they were caught by the fishermen.

In the South China Sea, the missile-carrying cruiser "Admiral Fokin" met up with the large ASW ship "Skoryy" and the destroyer "Vozbuzhdennyy." The subsequent cruise was carried out by the entire detachment.

In approaching Vietnam, preparations intensified to meet with the heroic people and their army and navy. In all the subunits of the ship, party and Komsomol meetings were held, and a special exercise was held with the guides in front of the attractive stands which would be put up for viewing on the day the ships were visited by the Vietnamese comrades.

A difficult task fell on the detachment navigator, Capt 1st Rank V. Popov, and the chief of the cruise staff, Capt 1st Rank Yu. Deryabin. Under the conditions of a narrow and winding channel, a strong current and shallow depth in the Coacam River [Red River], they had to bring the ships 13 miles upriver and promptly reach the assigned piers at the Port of Haiphong.

By the evening of 4 November, we were approaching the shores of Vietnam. At 0200 hours, along with a pilot, officers from the Vietnamese Navy arrived on the flagship. They affirmed the correctness of the decision for running up the river. In the predawn gloom, our ships entered the Coacam. Regardless of the early hour, many people had gathered on the shore, the islands and numerous junks. The workers of Vietnam warmly greeted the Soviet sailors. On the sides of our vessels were letters spelling out slogans in Vietnamese such as: "Long Live Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship!", "Glory to the Heroic Vietnamese People," and others. At the designated time, the salvoes of the salute to the nation resounded.

At the pier, the Soviet sailors were welcomed by Comrade Chin Thai Hung, a member of the Bureau of the Haiphong City Party Committee and the Deputy Chairman of the People's Committee of the City of Haiphong, and Sr Lt Comrade Doan Ba Khan, the deputy commander of the Vietnamese Navy. In welcoming us, Chin Thai Hung said that this visit would further strengthen the friendship and military solidarity between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples.

Upon arrival in Haiphong, Vice Adm N. Yasakov paid a visit to the first secretary of the Haiphong City Party Committee and member of the VCP [Vietnamese Communist Party] Central Committee, Bui Quong Tao, and to the chairman of the People's Committee of Haiphong, Doan Thuy Than, as well as to the Soviet Ambassador to Vietnam, Boris Nikolayevich Chaplin, and the Consul General to Vietnam, Feliks Fedorovich Konkin. On the same day, Vice Adm Yasakov was received at the Chief Staff of the Vietnamese Navy by the commander of the Vietnamese Navy, Maj Gen Dap Van Quyong, and the political commissar of the Vietnamese Navy, Maj Gen Hoang Cha. A warm and friendly conversation took place.

The Soviet sailors laid a wreath on the monument to the fallen soldiers in Haiphong. A press conference was held on board the flagship for Vietnamese correspondents.

In the evening at a Haiphong theater, a major concert was given for our sailors dedicated to the 62d anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. With great skill the artists performed in Russian such Soviet songs as "Katyusha," "Moscow Evenings," and others.

On the next day, a detachment of Soviet sailors accompanied by a band marched through the streets of Haiphong. The Vietnamese looked with inspiration at the representatives of the Soviet country, their flawless bearing and youth. Cries of greeting and good wishes were heard.

Then our vessels were visited by the Soviet Ambassador to Vietnam, the Soviet Consul General, the ambassadors of the socialist countries, the commander of the Vietnamese Navy, and representatives from the party and administrative bodies of the cities of Haiphong and Hanoi.

The inhabitants of Haiphong also visited the ships, including workers, representatives of the intelligentsia and servicemen. Particularly many inhabitants of Haiphong visited the ships during the days of the celebration of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They came in entire families. The Vietnamese became acquainted with the life and service of our sailors. It was particularly lively around the photographic exhibits. The visitors carefully examined the photographs devoted to the life and activities of the Soviet Navy, and they asked many questions. They were interested in how the Soviet people lived, what service was like in the navy, what were the impressions about meetings with the people of Haiphong, what our sailors had liked when they visited the Vietnamese land, and so forth. The Vietnamese comrades inevitably emphasized the role and importance of the selfless aid of the Soviet Union to building socialism in Vietnam and in defending its victories against enemies. They said that the Soviet people were the true friends of Vietnam, and were particularly grateful for our specialists, particularly physicians, who had been and were there then. The Vietnamese sailors had high praise for the aid given by our Navy in clearing the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin of mines, and in training the personnel of the Vietnamese Navy.

During the days of celebrating the 62d anniversary of Great October, the Haiphong City Committee and the City People's Committee organized a reception for Soviet sailors. A group of officers headed by Vice Adm N. Yasakov was invited to the capital of Socialist Vietnam, Hanoi. From Haiphong to Hanoi they drove along the Coacam River. Around us nature was enchanting with palm trees, plane trees, cane taller than a man and banana plants. November in Vietnam is considered a cold month, but the temperature does not fall below 25°.

We looked with interest at the small plots of land which had been won away from the river and were enclosed by earth embankments. Each day through special channels, during the flood tide, water is let in, and drained out on the ebb tide. Here rice is grown.

Rice, rice, everywhere rice Infrequently we came upon plots where it had already been harvested. In some places the land was being plowed for a new crop, and they were plowing almost the same way as they had scores and even hundreds of years ago, with buffaloes.

We were not surprised at this. For centuries the colonialists had destroyed the country and held up its development. The women worked in the fields while the men with weapons in hand fought the invaders. And at present in the north of Vietnam, there are few representatives of the male population. The men are engaged in defending the frontiers of the fatherland.

Still the nation lacks a great deal. There are few tractors and other agricultural equipment. For this reason manual labor still prevails.

The Vietnamese people are exceptionally industrious. Under difficult conditions they are building the cities, restoring the plants and spanning rivers. Soviet sailors traveled with excitement over the famous 3-km long bridge over the Red River which survived the days of fierce American bombing.

Hanoi is impressive in its greatness. Here picturesque nature has been beautifully combined with the creativity of human hands. The city has many magnificent buildings and monuments of art and antiquity. In Hanoi fable is closely intertwined with reality. The inhabitants of Hanoi showed the Soviet sailors a lake located almost in the center of the city called the Lake of the Returned Sword. A museum is located on its islands where one of the main exhibits is a dried out gigantic turtle which is highly revered by the Vietnamese. Many believe that in antiquity it presented the ancestor of the Vietnamese people with a sword by which he freed the country of foreign invaders. Since then the Vietnamese people have shown constant vigilance and are always ready to struggle for their freedom and independence.

On 7 November, in Hanoi, Vice Adm N. Yasakov was received by a member of the Politburo of the VCP Central Committee, the Prime Minister of the government of Vietnam, Comrade Pham Van Dong. The central organ of the VCP Central Committee, NHAN DAN, wrote: "Comrade Pham Van Dong welcomed the visit by the detachment of Soviet naval vessels and feels that this visit is a fine manifestation of the constantly growing friendship and military solidarity between the peoples, armies and navies of our two countries." The newspapers also reported on the reception of Vice Adm N. Yasakov by the member of the Politburo of the VCP Central Committee and Chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Army, Arm Gen Van Tien Dung, who in warmly welcoming the friendly visit by the Soviet naval vessels to Vietnam, said: "The visit by the detachment of Soviet naval vessels to Vietnam will provide a new impetus for the building of socialism in our country and to the cause of defending the socialist fatherland, and its strengthens our confidence that our people will thwart all the intrigues by the reactionary clique of the Beijing leadership vis-a-vis Vietnam."

On the same day at the Ministry of Defense, the member of the VCP Central Committee, the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Army, Lt Gen Lieh Chong Tan, gave a reception in honor of the Soviet sailors at which Lieh Chong Tan and N. Yasakov exchanged speeches.

The Soviet sailors visited the mausoleum of Ho Chi Minh and saw the places where he lived and worked. The simplicity of the great son of the Vietnamese people was striking. The first president of Vietnam refused to live in the residence of the former masters of the city and country. He lived in a humble house which was two open verandas: one 3 x 4 m in size served as a sleeping room, and the other of the same size as a working office. In a prominent place were the works of V. I. Lenin

which he did not part with all his life. Ho Chi Minh was a simple man always accessible to the working people.

The last day of our visit to Vietnam was particularly full of measures. The ships were visited by a delegation from the Vietnamese-Soviet Friendship Society, and a match of the navy volleyball teams was organized. The members of the sailors' amateur artistic ensemble gave a concert for the workers and men of the Vietnamese Army.

From morning to evening the ships were visited by the inhabitants of Haiphong. The comment books contained many cordial entries:

"I congratulate you on the holiday of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Let the Soviet Army and Navy be friends of the Vietnamese Army. Serviceman of the Vietnamese Army."

"We, the Vietnamese women, having visited on board the Soviet naval ship, have seen the might of the Soviet Navy. We are proud of the Soviet Union. The friendship between the Vietnamese and Soviet peoples will live forever. We will always believe the Soviet people and the Soviet Army.

"We wish you health and success in service."

"I visited your ship with great joy. You, the Soviet heroes of the great socialist country, have demonstrated true solidarity and friendship between the two peoples and between the Vietnamese Army and the Soviet Army."

An excursion through Haiphong was organized by bus for the Soviet sailors. The Vietnamese live humbly, they are simply but neatly dressed. In their homes much has been done by their own hands. The Vietnamese are great masters. From a young age the children are taught to sew, weave, glue, make pottery, and so forth.

There is little public transport in the city. The basic type of conveyance is the bicycle. Both in the city and in the countryside, hundreds and thousands of bicyclists flow in close ranks toward each other. Close to Hanoi, along the main route, a special asphalted lane for bicyclists has been built.

The Vietnamese people are still confronted with many difficulties. The country is lifting itself up by its bootstraps, and is steadfastly eliminating the consequences of the age-old colonial slavery and intervention. In the north and in the south of Vietnam one can still see the traces of the barbarian U.S. aggression. The American interventionists showed exceptional cruelty against the peaceful population and killed and maimed hundreds of thousands of women, children and old people. The U.S. troops and their mercenaries carried out "scorched earth" tactics, they poisoned plantings, destroyed forests, and created vast zones of desert. Vietnam is providing great aid to the fraternal countries of Laos and Kampuchea. And the aggressor in the north cannot restrain itself. It constantly creates military provocations and keeps large forces of its troops on the border with Vietnam. Restraint is necessary, and the greatest vigilance is necessary. The heroic Vietnamese people led by the Communist Party are successfully building a socialist society.

Early in the morning of 9 November, preparations for departure got underway. At the piers were thousands of Vietnamese citizens and servicemen. The farewells were touching. The young people, particularly the girls, endeavored to pass souvenirs over to the Soviet sailors including folk crafts and broad straw hats, as well as flowers. And in return we presented them with sailor's caps.

Long whistles by the ships announced the beginning of departure. Whistles also sounded from the pier and the vessels standing near us. Soon the detachment of ships was heading to home shores.

We left the hospitable fraternal country with a feeling of sincere sadness and pride for the heroic Vietnamese people. We believe in the bright future of socialist Vietnam. No hardships or no obstacles will make the Vietnamese depart from their designated goal.

Vietnam is not alone. The fraternal Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth are with it. The first official visit by Soviet naval ships to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was carried out successfully. It demonstrated the unbreakable unity and solidarity between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples, their armies and navies, and the readiness by collective effort to dependably protect the socialist victories against encroachments by any aggressors. It has become one of the active forms of strengthening the military association of the navies of the Soviet Union and Socialist Vietnam.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 41. Soviet sailors on the streets of Hanoi (photo by WO [Michman] M. Rodin).

2. p 43. Meetings of Soviet sailors with men of the Vietnamese Army. In the center, the commander of the special-purpose detachment, Sr Lt Do Viet Quyong.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: YUGOSLAV ART OF WARFARE

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[Article published under the heading "In the Armies of Socialist Countries" by Colonel of the Yugoslav People's Army Nikola Anic (Nikola Anich): "Art of Warfare in the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia in the National Liberation War of 1941-1945"]

[Excerpts] The military art of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLAY) developed in the course of the national liberation war against the Nazi occupiers, their allies, as well as their supporters, the Quislings and counterrevolutionary forces. The content of the military art of the PLAY was determined by the policy of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) on the questions of national defense during the prewar years and in the course of the war, as well as by the nature and objectives of the people's liberation movement.

The main features in the military art of the PLAY during the previous war were offensiveness and initiative. Offensiveness was the principle, and initiative predominated in all the methods of armed combat and combat operations. In the course of offensives, the enemy's actions were checked. Our army imposed its will on the enemy, and forced the battle to be carried out in accord with the military art of the PLAY. And regardless of the fact that the enemy was better armed and had numerical superiority, the men of the PLAY won one victory after another.

Defensive in the people's liberation war was not accepted either as a strategic concept or as a type of strategic operations. It represented a type of operational and tactical action within the framework of a continuous strategic offensive during the entire people's liberation war. This was a reflection of the revolutionary and offensive nature of the liberation struggle. Defense was characterized by dynamic and bold maneuvers and active operations. A maneuver is an inseparable element of combat operations. Due to it it was possible to neutralize the numerical and technical superiority of the enemy. A maneuver, as a rule, was employed together with active defenses on a front with strikes in the flank and rear of the enemy grouping. Its effectiveness was also achieved by the great mobility of the troops and the exceptional tenacity of the men in the PLAY. In the first stage of the war, maneuvers were improved within the framework of tactical operations, and nevertheless in their aggregate they made it possible to achieve operational and strategic results, since liberated territories were created, the occupation system of the enemy was substantially undermined, and its forces were scattered over significant

distances. With the formation of brigades and later divisions and corps, new opportunities arose for maneuvering in the aim of broadening and strengthening the people's liberation movement. Strategic maneuvering in the people's liberation war was determined both by military-strategic as well as political goals. It stemmed from the political and military strategy of the people's liberation war.

In the military art of the PLAY, the grouping of forces also occupied a prominent place. The initial form of the strategic grouping was expressed in the broad distribution of forces according to the areas of the Yugoslav theater of war. And the center of gravity was on the territory outside of cities. By this maximum use was achieved of a larger portion of the human and material resources for conducting armed combat. As a result, the occupation forces were scattered over vast territories and assumed a passive position. This made it possible for the PLAY to gradually achieve superiority over the enemy and ensure strategic initiative. Another form of the strategic grouping was the creation of the operational group of the Supreme Staff of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] and the PDY [Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia], and later also other operational-strategic groupings which represented a strong maneuverable means for conducting large offensive operations and for winning initiative in the entire theater of war.

The Supreme Staff of the PLA and PDY directed combat operations proceeding from a unity of the military and political objectives of the armed struggle and the people's liberation movement in all the stages of the war. Such coordination was possible with the existence of a unified military art on all Yugoslav territory with the unified objectives, unified armed forces and with a common armed struggle. Also well organized was the strategic cooperation of the PLAY with the Red Army during the period of the liberation of the eastern regions of Serbia and particularly in the Belgrad Operation.

Surprise was one of the essential principles in the military art of the PLAY. By combining various methods of armed struggle and military operations with political and other activities in the Yugoslav theater of war, a situation was created in which the enemy objectively could not avoid unexpected strikes, regardless of the measures employed by it.

Continuity and intensity of combat operations were also essential traits in the military art of the PLAY. These were achieved by daytime and nighttime operations on all levels, as well as by making strikes against all elements of the enemy defenses. This forces the enemy to be under constant stress, to scatter its forces and thus remain passive. However, a maximum expenditure of effort was also required from the PLAY troops.

The military art of the PLAY did not know hopeless situation even when individual operational groupings were surrounded by superior enemy forces, and regardless of the fact that as a whole the people's liberation war was waged in a complete strategic encirclement, thousands of kilometers away from the Allied Fronts, under rather difficult conditions with a shortage of materiel.

The operation, as a form of action, was carried out at the very outset of the revolt, and was related to the actions of the partisan detachments in Western Serbia in 1941. Later on it was so developed that it became the prevailing form of combat operations. Operations usually represented several interrelated engagements.

battles and other forms of combat actions and resistance. Operational and territorial troops and sociopolitical organizations participated in them. They also encompassed the enemy rear. This was a particular feature of them.

In the concluding period of the people's liberation war, many offensive and several defensive operations were carried out, and these encompassed significant territories. They were conducted by the troops and by the partisans. The operational troops operated on the front, and the operational-partisan ones in the enemy rear. Their actions were interrelated by the common strategic objective, by the unified command and by the unified general concept of the maneuver.

Along with land combat operations, an armed struggle also developed on the Adriatic Sea and the islands. The initial methods and forms of armed struggle had the nature of sabotage and subversion, and later other methods were employed, for example, an attack on enemy sea transport. Subsequently, a true partisan war developed here. After the surrender of Italy in September 1943, armed struggle at sea grew into joint hostilities by the operational and partisan forces. This was expressed in the carrying out of joint operations by land and sea forces. At the end of the war, the Yugoslav navy had 258 ships and vessels of various types.

One of the main tasks of the PLAY consisted in attacking enemy lines of communications which were of strategic importance for the enemy. It used them for moving troops, weapons and equipment to the Soviet-German Front, to the Mediterranean and North Africa, as well as for conducting operations against the PLA and PDY. The fascists also transported the plundered riches of our country over these communications. For this reason, from the start until the end of the war, the enemy carefully defended and protected them, allocating significant men and equipment for this. The tactics of the struggle on the lines of communications was diverse. It included surprise and brief strikes, raids and ambushes, the destruction of the lines of communications and their mining. The struggle was conducted by units of the armed forces (operational and territorial troops), by special sabotage units as well as the population.

During the people's liberation war, an armed struggle also developed in the cities. Virtually all strata of the population resisted the occupiers. The basic methods of action were sabotage, subversion, assault and attack, and sometimes also large-scale attacks with the aim of seizing, holding and keeping individual important urban objects until the approach of forces from the front or the partisan units. There were sabotage, combat and assault groupings of varying composition made up for carrying out one or many missions. They consisted predominantly of the youth, members of the CPY and Yugoslav Youth Union and antifascists.

In the course of the war the PLAY had to solve difficult problems related to the replenishing of the troops, their supply, and the treating of sick and wounded. The troops did not have bases, depots, plants, factories or any material supplies. The basic source of support was supply from the population, captured equipment, and in the later period, Allied aid. Naturally, these problems had to be considered in carrying out all the political and military tasks during the people's liberation war. The necessity of treating sick and wounded and protecting them often necessitated the going over to a decisive defensive or frontal operations, as was the case, for example, in the battles of Neretva and Suteska.

The leadership of the people's liberation war was completely concentrated in the hands of the higher leading bodies, the CPY Central Committee and the Supreme Staff of the PLA and PDY, which were based upon the party and Komsomol cadres. The military knowledge of the command personnel from the very outset of the revolt was systematically increased under the difficult conditions of an armed struggle. Various courses and officers schools were organized, and 28,000 students went through them. A portion of the command personnel was trained by the Allies. The USSR trained 500 tankmen for the PLAY.*

The higher military leading body during the people's liberation war was the Supreme Staff of the PLA and PDY, and from 1 March 1945, the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army. The Supreme Staff included members of the Politburo and several members of the CPY Central Committee, and later certain military leaders. Initially the staff performed political and military functions. Later, from the end of 1942, its political functions were turned over to the Antifascist Council for the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia. The Supreme Staff was completely shifted to working out military art and military theory and to the organizational development of the armed forces, it provided an overall direction and instructions, and carried out direct leadership of the people's liberation war over the entire territory of Yugoslavia through the national, regional and other staffs. Main staffs were organized in all the present-day socialist republics and regions of Yugoslavia from the very outset. This was caused not only by military necessity, but was also a practical solution to the nationality question and national self-determination. These staffs, together with the national leading party bodies, on the basis of the overall directives of the Supreme Staff and the CPY Central Committee, proceeding from the military-political situation in the country, settled the questions of conducting the war and revolution.

Josip Broz Tito was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the PLA and PDY, and later the Yugoslav Army. He, as the General Secretary of the CPY Central Committee, at the same time headed both the Main and then the Supreme Staff. In this position Tito showed himself to be not only a leading political figure in the party, but also the creator, skillful organizer and leader of the people's liberation army, as well as a true leader of the liberation movement.

During the 4-year liberation war of the peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia, in the struggle against the numerically and technically superior enemy, the People's Liberation Army or the Yugoslav Army was created. Along with the people the army victoriously concluded the war and revolution on the territory of our country. The armed forces of the people's liberation movement created in the process of the armed struggle by the end of the war had grown into a modern army of 800,000 men. The formation and development of the PLAY from partisan detachments to armies affirmed the necessity of creating armed forces and conducting an armed struggle under the conditions of the occupation of the nation.

The military art of the PLAY or Yugoslav Army, in stemming from the nature of the liberation and revolutionary war, was expressed in various methods of armed combat and other forms of resistance, the objective and purpose of which were the liberation

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*In addition, the USSR trained 4,516 aviation specialists --Ed.

of the country and the establishing of a new, popular power, and the socialist transformation of Yugoslavia. A particular feature of the military art of the PLAY was the imposing on the enemy of our method of conducting the war, and gradually altering the balance of forces in favor of our army. The military art of the PLAY became a significant factor of victory in the people's liberation war. It enriched the theory and practice of military art in the liberation and revolutionary wars.

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MILITARY THEORY: ENGELS' CONTRIBUTION NOTED

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[Article published under the heading "Scientific Information" by Docent, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Col V. Shumikhin: "A Great Expert on Military Affairs"]

[Text] 28 November marks the 160th birthday of Friedrich Engels, one of the founders of scientific communism, the leader of the international proletariat and the associate and friend of Karl Marx. Engels was an outstanding theoretician and thinker and a passionate fighter for the cause of the working class. With his creative genius, he encompassed virtually all questions of revolutionary theory and practice, and made an enormous contribution to philosophy, political economy, the theory of scientific socialism, the strategy and tactics of the class struggle of the proletariat, to natural science, linguistics and other sciences. "It is impossible to understand Marxism and it is impossible to treat it completely without considering all the works of Engels," wrote V. I. Lenin.[1]

Engels' role in the area of military affairs was exceptionally great. He was the founder of Marxist military science and the first military theoretician of the working class. The critical reworking by Engels of all the previous military theoretical heritage, and the application of dialectical materialism to an understanding of war and military affairs marked a revolutionary change in the views of these problems and the appearance of a qualitatively new proletarian military science.

The military talent of Engels was highly regarded by K. Marx. "...You will soon be recognized as the first military authority in London,"[2] he wrote with pride of the impression which was produced on the English by the brilliant and profoundly reasoned articles by his associate in the press on military questions. And we should also note the description given to Friedrich Engels by Wilhelm Liebknecht who wrote: "If a revolution had occurred again during his lifetime, we would have had in Engels our Carnot,[3] the organizer of armies and victories, a military thinker."[4] Engels was also called a great military expert by V. I. Lenin who urged the communists to learn from him a serious attitude and tenacity in the mastery of military knowledge.[5]

F. Engels showed an interest in military affairs while a young man. In 1841-1842, in serving his military obligation in the Prussian Guards Artillery, he gained significant military experience. In addition, Engels took a most active part in the revolutionary battles which developed in May-July 1849 in the Rhineland and in

Southwestern Germany, in Elberfelde, Pfalz and Baden. Being the aide of A. Willich, the commander of a detachment of volunteers in the rebel Badden-Pfalz Army, they worked out together the plans for military operations and led the rebel subunits in carrying out the most difficult and dangerous combat missions.

During the days of the battles, Friedrich Engels was always on the frontline, and he showed courage, bravery, initiative and resourcefulness. He was concerned with providing the troops with weapons and ammunition, he maintained contact with other units and went out on reconnaissance. In the retreat, he was together with the rebels who covered the retreat of the main forces. When the revolt was finally defeated, he with the last units of the revolutionary army left Germany and crossed into Swiss territory.

In the middle of November 1850, the German emigre and revolutionary settled in Manchester. Here, along with working out the political ideas of Marxism, he began a systematic study of military affairs. "...I have begun cramming in military sciences," he wrote in one of his letters of 19 June 1851.[6] K. Marx also noticed that after personal involvement in the Baden Campaign of 1849, "Engels made a study of military questions his specialty."[7]

The decision to take up this difficult problem was dictated primarily by political considerations. Engels realized what enormous significance "the military aspect of the matter would assume in the coming movement," that is, under the conditions of the preparations for and carrying out of a proletarian revolution.[8]

The range of military problems of interest to Engels was unusually broad. He worked out the most important concepts about the origin of war and its class essence, the nature of wars and the attitude of the proletariat to them, on the role of the masses of people, as well as the material and moral factors in a war. Engels was the first Marxist theoretician who disclosed the class nature of an army and its purpose. He also demonstrated the ability to extract from the history of armed struggle of various times and peoples the lessons and experience needed for the successful actions of the working class in revolutionary battles.

Engels appeared as a military theoretician for the first time in a series of articles on the June revolt of 1848 in Paris. These were published in NEUE RHEINISCHE ZEITUNG. Written during the days of the battles and soon after their end, they are alive with the pathos of the struggle and at the same time provide a profound analysis of the causes and define the significance of the revolt.

In taking up the course of revolutionary events, Engels analyzed in detail the military organization of the Parisian workers, he drew a number of important conclusions on the nature, significance and methods of the street and barricade fight under the specific conditions of those times, he vividly described the exceptional valor and self-sacrifice of the rebels in the uneven engagement, he disclosed their mistakes and explained (from the military viewpoint) in what instance the Parisian proletariat could have won.

The initial ideas of Marxist teachings about the preparations for and carrying out of an armed revolt as a higher form of the revolutionary struggle were elaborated by Engels in many other works. He emphasized that "a revolt is an art, precisely as is a war and the other types of art."[9] He felt that a revolutionary party

should never toy with a revolt if there was no conviction to carry things out to the end, as soon as a revolt was started, it was essential to act with the greatest determination and to go over to the offensive, as an offensive was death to any armed revolt. It was necessary to catch the enemy unaware while its troops were still scattered; each day new although even small successes had to be achieved; a moral predominance had to be kept and this provided the first successful movement of the rebels; vacillating elements had to be attracted, they would always follow the stronger and be on the more secure side; the enemy had to be forced to retreat before it could recover its forces.[10] These rules of armed revolt which have now already become classic were worked out by V. I. Lenin in his works "The Bolsheviks Should Take Power," "Marxism and Revolt," "The Advice of an Outsider," and others, and then were brilliantly carried out in October 1917, in Petrograd. The leader of the Bolshevik party, in making preparations for an armed action by the Russian proletariat against the bourgeois Provisional Government, worked out the question of the staff of the revolt, the choice of the direction of the main thrust, the necessity of a predominant superiority of forces in the main sector, and so forth. He particularly stressed that the decisive carrying out of the plan of the revolt required from the rebels "art and triple boldness."[11]

The elaboration of the teachings about armed revolt which have become part of the treasurehouse of Marxist-Leninist science, as a most important component in the theory of proletarian revolution, is the greatest accomplishment of Engels and Lenin to the international communist and workers movement.

In the period of national liberation wars which followed after the revolutions of 1848-1849, Friedrich Engels closely observed the national liberation struggle of the suppressed peoples. He welcomed the rise of the movement of the Southern Slavs (against the Turkish yoke), as well as the Poles, Czechs, Hungarians and Italians.

Engels showed unflagging attention and sympathy for the struggle for national liberation of the Chinese, Indian and other peoples of the East, in coming out decisively for the right of the enslaved peoples to employ every possible means, including a liberation war, against the powerful military machine of the colonialists. His numerous articles devoted to this struggle served, along with the corresponding articles by Marx, as the basis for a scientific elaboration of the national-colonial question.

Engels showed himself to be a profound expert on military affairs in his numerous publications on the Crimean War of 1853-1856, the Civil War in the United States of 1861-1865, and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. His extensive knowledge on military theory and history was also published in the articles prepared by him for the "New American Encyclopedia" (published in 1857-1861). One of the largest was the article on the "Army." In it Engels provided a thorough description of an army as an implement of war, he recreated the picture of its evolution, starting from antiquity (the age of the Pharaoh Ramses II) up to the second half of the 19th century. He showed the national features of armies in different countries, the social and political causes of their flourishing and decline. "Your 'Army' is magnificent..." wrote Marx to him.[12]

A major contribution of Engels as a military theoretician was his materialistic explanation of the origin and essence of wars and armies during the various stages of the history of mankind. He repudiated the previously predominant idealistic

thesis about the eternal nature of wars and armies, and showed that they arose with a class society. With the elimination of social antagonisms, wars will disappear along with their implements, armies and weapons.

The classic work by Engels "Anti-Duhring" (1878) became a compendium of Marxist views on the fundamental questions of war, the army and military science. In this work he criticized the idealistic theory of violence. "Nothing so depends upon economic conditions," he stated in "Anti-Duhring," "as precisely the army and navy. The weapons, effective strength, organization, tactics and strategy depend primarily upon the level of production achieved at the given moment and upon the means of communications."[13] "The entire organization of armies and the methods employed by them in conducting combat, and along with this the victories and defeats, are dependent upon the material, that is, economic, conditions: upon the human material and upon weapons, and consequently, upon the quality and quantity of the population and upon equipment."[14]

The works of Friedrich Engels contain not only a brilliant analysis of military affairs in his contemporary and preceding periods of history, but also they anticipate the paths of the further development of military affairs. Particularly important scientific predictions were made in the last decade of Engels' life. He very attentively followed all the changes in international relations, since at this time two opposing blocs of the major imperialist powers of Europe had begun to form: the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) and the Entente (England, France and Russia).

In analyzing the reasons for the growth of military expenditures caused by the continuous improvement in military equipment, Lenin proved that this suicidal policy would lead either to the economic ruin of the participants in the ever-accelerating arms race, or to a destructive war which "should be fiercer, bloodier, more expensive and exhausting than any of the previous wars."[15]

The great theoretician of Marxism predicted that the imminent war inevitably would assume the nature of a world-wide military conflict. The contradictions between the basic European countries represented such a complicated knot that the possibility of local wars was improbable. "...The one who acts first would provoke a universal world war,"[16] he felt.

In the introduction to Borkheim's pamphlet "In Memory of the Hurrah-Patriots of 1806-1807," Engels wrote that the coming war "would be a world war of previously unprecedented scope and unprecedented force. From 8 to 10 million soldiers would strangle each other and pick clean all of Europe beyond the worst of the swarms of locusts."[17]

The initiator of the world war, in the opinion of Engels, would probably be the aggressive German Empire founded by Bismarck. "...For Prussia or Germany," he pointed out, "at present anything else than a world war is impossible."[18] And Engels' prediction on the inevitability of its military defeat came true. He felt that a world-scale military conflict could last for 4 years and would bring Germany only hardship "and shot-through bones."[19]

In warning of the coming danger of a world war, Engels constantly urged the European socialists, the working class and all workers to resist its start in every

possible way and to act against the inflating of the military budgets and arms race. He proved that the working class and its party had no grounds to desire a war, for they would be the first to feel its hardships and suffer the greatest losses. The socialists, Friedrich Engels pointed out, "are interested in maintaining peace, for precisely they must pay for all the costs of the war."[20]

Running as a constant theme through Engels' statements is the notion that peaceful conditions are better for the development of a revolution, and that the bourgeoisie would endeavor to use a military situation for making heavy blows against the workers movement and instigating chauvinistic and nationalistic moods. A war, wrote, "would cause the violent and universal suppression of our movement,"[21] "a war, if it is started, would be waged only in the aim of impeding revolution."[22]

Engels urged like-thinking revolutionaries and the broad masses of the proletariat to decisively resist the military aspirations of the bourgeois governments and party, and to rebuff the chauvinistic attitudes in their own ranks. He repeatedly emphasized that the working masses are the most consistent fighters for peace, and that the struggle against military danger is the international duty of the proletarians of all countries. "...An alliance of the workers of all countries," taught Engels, "ultimately will eradicate any wars."[23]

The militaristic plans of the ruling circles should be resisted by the working class, in the opinion of the proletarian strategist, by a program of struggle for reducing weapons and for a firm and lasting peace. Engels worked out and stated this program in a series of articles entitled "Can Europe Disarm" published in 1893. The concrete proposals made in it, the feasibility of which was convincingly and clearly proven by him from the military, political and economic viewpoint within the then-existing bourgeois society, were, in essence, the first program elaborated in detail to fight for the limitation of weapons and the prevention of war.

The scientifically sound proposals of Engels on the enormous possiblities of the working masses of the world in the struggle for peace and universal disarmament are particularly timely in our days when the imperialist powers headed by the United States are endeavoring to reject the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems, for they are resisting with all force a lessening of international tension and are planning a new war against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth.

Engels did not limit himself to depicting the gigantic scope and devastating nature of a future war or the improbable sacrifices and numberless calamities which it would bring mankind. He also voiced the firm conviction that a coming war would cause a universal economic and political crisis which would shake the very foundations of bourgeois society.

In no way linking the possibility of a proletarian revolution with only military cataclysms, Engels at the same time endeavored to outline a strategy and tactics for the socialists in the event that a world war would still break out. His basic idea consisted in the following. If it was impossible to prevent a war, and the working class still did not possess sufficient forces for carrying out this very difficult task, then the socialist parties should use the crisis for overthrowing the bourgeois order and capturing political power by the proletariat.

A war in which the party of the working class would carry out this revolutionary line "should either lead to an immediate victory of socialism or so shake the old order of things and leave after itself such a pile of ruins that the existence of the old capitalist society would be even more impossible than before...."[25]

In the previously mentioned introduction to Borkheim's pamphlet, Engels, in turning directly to the ruling classes, expressed the same notion: "If nothing more remains for you than to commence the last great military dance...if you unleash the forces which you will later be unable to control, then, no matter what happens, at the end of the tragedy you will be a ruin, and the victory of the proletariat will either already be won or will be inevitable."[26]

"What a genial prophecy!" wrote V. I. Lenin on the given prediction many years later, at the end of World War I. "How infinitely rich in thoughts is each phrase of this precise, clear, terse and scientific class analysis!"[27]

Among the military works by Engels, a special place is held by the incomplete manuscript "Possibilities and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852." It formulated the most important theoretical concepts on the ways for the development of military art in the armies of the victorious proletarian revolution. Engels pointed out that these armies which must defend the actual fatherland of the proletariat would therefore possess unprecedented might. The gigantic growth of the productive forces of the new society and the flourishing of technology and culture would lie at the basis of the continuous increase in their massness, maneuverability and striking power. "In precisely the same way that a proletarian revolution in industry will consist not in eliminating steam engines but rather increasing their number, so in military affairs it will not be a question of reducing the size of the army and its mobility, but on the contrary, raising both to a higher level."[28]

Engels made inspired predictions on the new military science which would become "the necessary product of new social relations,"[29] and on the new, proletarian method of conducting a war which was more effective than all the previous ones. "The emancipation of the proletariat...," he wrote, "will have its particular reflection in military affairs and will create its own particular, new military method."[30]

History in the example of our country has affirmed Engels' correctness. Having adopted and creatively developed the military theoretical heritage of K. Marx and F. Engels, V. I. Lenin worked out the teachings on the defense of the socialist fatherland. Under the direct leadership of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, the powerful Soviet Armed Forces were created, and these for 65 years now have dependably guarded and defended the victories of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the creative labor of the Soviet people.

Time has not taken its toll on the military theoretical heritage of Friedrich Engels, regardless of the unceasing attempts by bourgeois military theoreticians and historians to distort his most important theses and conclusions. Enriched under new historical conditions with new experience and raised to new heights in the works of V. I. Lenin, the decisions of party congresses and the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, in the USSR Constitution and the works of L. I. Brezhnev, Marxist-Leninist teachings about war and the army serve as an unshakable theoretical and methodological basis for the organizational development and strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of the other socialist states, and as a constant

guide to action and the organizing of the armed defense of socialism against encroachments by the imperialists and any other aggressors. The continuous process of mastering these teachings by our military personnel as well as their carrying out are one of the main conditions for the high combat readiness and capability of the Soviet Armed Forces.

FOOTNOTES

[1]V. I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 26, p 93.

[2]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 33, p 23.

[3]L. N. Carnot (1753-1823) was a talented leader of the armed struggle of revolutionary France against the interventionists and Royalists during the French Revolution of 1789-1794.

[4]"Vospominaniya o Markse i Engel'se" [Memoirs About Marx and Engels], Moscow, Politizdat, 1956, p 137.

[5]See V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 10, p 340.

[6]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 37, p 483.

[7]Ibid., Vol 29, p 475.

[8]Ibid., Vol 27, p 483.

[9]Ibid., Vol 8, p 100.

[10]Ibid.

[11]V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 34, p 384.

[12]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 29, p 154.

[13]Ibid., Vol 20, p 171.

[14]Ibid., p 175.

[15]Ibid., Vol 36, p 590.

[16]Ibid., p 531.

[17]Ibid., Vol 21, p 361.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., Vol 45, p 121.

[20]Ibid., Vol 21, p 327.

[21]Ibid., Vol 37, p 140.

[22]Ibid., Vol 21, p 327.

[23]Ibid., Vol 17, p 5.

[24]Ibid., Vol 22, pp 259-260.

[25]Ibid., Vol 21, p 361.

[26]V. I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 36, p 473.

[27]K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch.," Vol 7, p 510

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., p 509.

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BOOK REVIEW: KAPITSA'S BOOK ON CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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[Review by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col I. Slivin, of the book "KNR: Tri Desyatiletiya--Tri Politiki" (The PRC: Three Decades--Three Policies), by M. S. Kapitsa, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, 576 pages]

[Text] The ideology and policy of Maoism and the practices of the Chinese leaders are a continuous chain of betrayals and treachery to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, to the interests of the international workers and communist movement, and the siding with the reactionary forces of imperialism, aggression and fascism acting against the countries of the socialist commonwealth and the working masses who are fighting for national and social liberation. The listed factors are convincingly brought out by the recently published fundamental research of Prof M S. Kapitsa reviewed here. It has been worked out on the basis of extensive factual material, and contains a profound analysis of the domestic and foreign political course of the Chinese leaders and their hegemonistic, great-power aims which have led to the class, ideological and moral decline of the Chinese leaders.

The first decade of the development of the PRC was characterized by the carrying out of a policy of active cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries, and by its participation in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism and for the maintaining of peace. However, even in 1953-1958, as is pointed out in the book, in the foreign policy of China there appeared elements of great-power chauvinism and adventurism. This was expressed in the duplicity of Mao Zedung in his attitude toward the USSR, in the attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of other states, in the desire to take command of certain socialist countries, in the appearance of the sinister "theory" of the utility of nuclear war for revolution, and in the advancing of territorial claims on neighboring countries (p 160).

In the second decade the Maoists assumed positions of rabid anti-Sovietism, and went over to an overt struggle against the socialist commonwealth and communist parties, and to attempts to isolate the national liberation movement from the other revolutionary forces and put it under their control. At the same time they began to seek out ways to restore and strengthen relations with the imperialist powers. From 1960, the Maoists began to eradicate among party members and later among the entire population the feeling of fraternal friendship for the USSR, in preparing an abrupt about-face in foreign policy.

The overt transition of the Beijing leadership to the positions of imperialism occurred in the third decade. It saw and presently sees the main means for achieving its hegemonistic aspirations in achieving a military clash between the USSR and the United States under the condition that the very instigators remain on the sidelines of events. Hence the desperate resistance to any steps in the area of a lessening of international tension and the desire to exacerbate the situation in various regions of the world.

Having declared the USSR to be number-one enemy, the Maoist renegades drew closer and closer to aggressive U.S. imperialism, the bloody regimes of Chile and South Africa and other antipopular regimes, actually becoming their supporter in the struggle against the national liberation revolutions and socialism. In this regard the author rightly comments that "the logic of class betrayal has led the Chinese leadership from leftist-extremist, pseudorevolutionary positions to a direct military-political siding with world imperialism, and to the turning of the ideology and policy of Beijing into a variety of bourgeois anticommunism" (p 5).

The perfidious, aggressive essence of the great-power, hegemonistic policy of the Beijing leadership was particularly apparent in the naked piratical attack on Vietnam. Precisely this policy at present represents a serious threat to peace throughout the world.

The notorious "theory of three worlds" was proclaimed in April 1974 as a global foreign policy concept of Beijing. It has replaced the class approach in the placement of forces on the world scene by the nationalistic "principle" of the grouping of states regardless of the sociopolitical system, proceeding merely from their opportunity to participate in the struggle for achieving the hegemonistic aims of the Chinese leadership. This "theory" should justify the class betrayal of Beijing and its siding with imperialism and the reaction.

The concept of the "inevitability" and the "utility" of a new world war is the basic ideological doctrine aimed at aggravating the situation in the world. However, having encountered sharp condemnation by the world community, the ruling Chinese upper clique has somewhat modernized the thesis of the "inevitability" of war, having supplied it with an addendum on the probability of "deferring" war until the end of the current century.

The main aim of the Beijing leadership at present is to create a "great China" and to turn it into a powerful militaristic state. And behind the external socialist phraseology is concealed the fixed strategic aim of "turning China into the main power of the world which can dictate its will to other states..." (p 3). In publicizing in every possible way the program of "Four Modernizations," the Maoist leadership has made every effort to increase military might. At the 11th CCP Congress and after it, specific tasks were set in the area of militarization: to "make headway and strengthen preparations for war"; "not only to strengthen but also accelerate" the modernization of the army; "to increase the equipping of the army to a new level" primarily in the area of nuclear missile weapons, the aviation and navy (pp 342-343). These goals are to be realized with the aid of the Western countries by the greatest possible increase in military economic potential, by the militarization of social life and a maximum decline in the standard of living of the

Chinese workers. The military expenditures of China in 1979 exceeded 40 percent of the budget (third in the world).[1] And although the author in his book touches upon the military aspects of the policy of the Chinese leadership, it would be desirable to explore in greater detail the role of the army in its plans. Certainly the Beijing leaders see in a strong and modernized army primarily an effective implement for dictating and imposing their will and policy on other countries and peoples. At the same time the army has been given the police functions of combating any manifestations of dissatisfaction with the Maoist regime inside the country.

An important feature of the reviewed work is the comprehensive approach to analyzing the basic goals and directions of Chinese foreign policy. The author has focused close attention on disclosing its relations with the socialist, developing and capitalist powers. He has convincingly proven the desire of Beijing to put the socialist commonwealth under its influence and endeavor to disrupt it from within, to complicate the relations of all the socialist countries with the USSR, to force them into "neutrality" in the clash between the PRC and the USSR, and then force them over to Chinese positions (p 419). Characteristically, in the 1980's, the Beijing leaders are planning an intensification of the confrontation with the USSR and a further fanning of anti-Soviet hysteria.

The process of the transition of Beijing to the positions of imperialism (from its reserves to the rights of an ally) has been accompanied by specific actions on the part of the Chinese leadership both in the area of foreign and domestic policy. It has coordinated its actions with the U.S. rulers in providing help to the counter-revolutionary forces in Afghanistan, and in increasing tension in the relations between the countries of Southeast Asia and other regions.

The Chinese leaders are endeavoring to put the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America into opposition to the socialist commonwealth, to isolate them from the socialist states, and impose on them their formulas for economic development which ultimately will lead to backwardness and poverty.

The Chinese leaders have resorted to various tactics for establishing rule over entire countries and peoples. In Southeast Asia, Beijing has endeavored to establish "friendly" relations with the ASEAN member states (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines), and create a "united front" with them. And particular hopes have been placed on the support of the almost 20 million "hua qiao," the persons of Chinese origin living in these countries who have been assigned the role of a "fifth column."

The reviewed work thoroughly examines the consistent, internationalist policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government toward the Chinese people who previously received all-round aid from the Soviet Union. It contains an appeal to the workers, to the progressive, democratic and revolutionary forces to vigilantly defend their interests against the intrigues of the Beijing hegemonists. The June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee emphasized that at present "on an anti-Soviet basis hostile to the cause of peace, the aggressive circles of the West, and primarily the United States, are drawing closer to the Chinese leadership. The partnership of

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[1] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 2 April 1980.

imperialism and Beijing hegemonism represents a new dangerous phenomenon in world politics which is dangerous for all mankind, including for the American and Chinese peoples."[7]

For this reason, the unmasking of the provocative and aggressive activities of the Beijing leaders and the collective countermeasures of all the peace-loving forces of the world should become an insurmountable obstacle for the Maoists and the other instigators of war.

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[7] PRAVDA, 24 June 1980.

BOOK REVIEW: WARTIME TANK MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 28 Oct 80 pp 75-76

[Review by Docent, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Engr-Col V. Zelenskiy, and Professor, Doctor of Military Sciences, Engr-Col P. Oreshkin of the book "I Snova v Boy" (And Back in Battle), by A. P. Shvebig, Voyenizdat, 1979, 176 pages]

[Text] Voyenizdat has published a new book in the series "The Frontliners Relate." It thoroughly describes the organization of the tank engineer service of the units and formations, as well as the work of the specialists in repairing and rebuilding the combat and transport equipment. Its author is Engr-Maj Gen A. P. Shvebig who headed the repair and rebuilding subunits and units from October 1941 until the end of the war, holding the positions of deputy commander for technical affairs of a tank regiment, a brigade and a tank corps. He traveled a difficult path of combat from Moscow to Berlin.

Unfortunately, the designated subject up to the present has not been properly treated in the other publications on the Great Patriotic War. The reader has been little informed of the unstinting labor and heroism of the humble war workers, the soldiers, sergeants and officers in the technical service who evacuated the hit and malfunctioning combat vehicles from the battlefield, who rebuilt them close to the forward edge and returned them to battle, maintaining the high battleworthiness of the armored and mechanized troops.

The author writes with great affection about these men who knew well and responsibly performed their job and their military duty.

The reader's attention is drawn to the pages telling of the great mastery, resourcefulness, boldness and inventiveness of the men in the repair and rebuilding subunits and units. In the XII Uman', Order of Lenin, Red Banner and Order of Suvorov Guards Tank Corps[1] alone during the war years the repairmen returned 3,450 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts to battle as well as 9,550 motor vehicles (p 175). And a brigade of five repairmen of Guards Sr Sgt P. P. Medvedev which was part of the 168th Guards Mobile Repair Base in 32 months of the war rebuilt 270 tanks (pp 76, 168).

[1] Prior to 11 November 1944, the XVI Tank Corps.

The book also describes the organization of the technical support for the tank units and formations during many crucial engagements of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time it is not devoid of shortcomings. For example, it should have contained diagrams showing the places where the author, under field conditions, organized the repair and rebuilding of combat and transport equipment in the course of battles. Here there is not a single photograph of the best repairmen or of interesting episodes from the work and repair of the evacuation subunits on the battlefield, showing the difficult conditions of the war. There should have been more information about the repairmen who received orders and medals of the USSR, and their courage and heroism should have been described.

Undoubtedly, the value of the publication would be greater if the author had told about the difficult jobs of the best known repairmen who were employed in the national economy after the war. As a whole the book, regardless of these particular shortcomings, will play a positive role in propagandizing the experience acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War in the area of organizing and carrying out the reconstruction of combat and transport equipment in a combat situation.

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BOOK REVIEW: SYRIAN DEFENSE MINISTER ON ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT

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[Review by Lt Gen V. Budakov of the book "Scientific and Technical Progress and the Development of the Armed Forces" by Mustafa Talas, Damascus, 1979]

[Text] At the present stage the revolutionary liberation process which was started by the Great October Socialist Revolution to an ever-greater degree is having a beneficial effect on the Asian, African and Latin American countries, raising their activeness and role in the overall course of world history.

In his report "Great October and the Progress of Mankind," the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "It is exceptionally important that many liberated states have rejected the capitalist path of development and are setting as their goal the building of a society free of exploitation, and are orienting themselves toward socialism."[1] At present, on the ruins of the colonial system of imperialism a large group of states has formed with a socialist orientation, and among them a prominent place is held by the Syrian Arab Republic.

The experience of the intense revolutionary struggle of the exploited and suppressed peoples shows the reticence of imperialism to surrender the positions taken without a struggle. In endeavoring to maintain its presence in the developing and dependent states, it has employed all methods and means, including various military provocations and outright armed aggression. In this regard, in the countries where national liberation revolutions have occurred, from the very first days the question has arisen of protecting the states from internal counterrevolution and external aggression, and the elaboration of the theory and practice of military organizational development.

For the developing countries of very timely significance is the book published by the Syrian Minister of Defense, Doctor of Military Sciences, Corps Gen Mustafa Talas entitled "Scientific and Technical Progress and the Development of the Armed Forces," and which has been greeted with great interest in Syria.

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[1] L. I. Brezhnev, "Aktual'nyye Voprosy Ideologisheskoy Raboty KPSS" [Urgent Questions of CPSU Ideological Work], Vol 2, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978, p 400.

The book is devoted to the problem questions in the area of military affairs and characteristic for states on the noncapitalist path of development. It for the first time formulates the modern military doctrine of Syria, and the basic directions have been defined for increasing the defense might and organizational development of the armed forces.

In using rich factual material and profoundly analyzing the military doctrines of the leading capitalist countries, the author, using the example of Syria, shows how the ruling circles of the imperialist powers, and above all the United States, repeatedly with Israeli aid have organized military provocations and initiated local wars against Syria and other Arab states. Under these conditions, the further strengthening of the defense capability of the nation and the defense of progressive victories against imperialist and Zionist aggression, the book emphasizes, can be successfully carried out only with the necessary contingent of troops equipped with modern weapons and material and well trained on the basis of advanced military science.

In analyzing the content of military doctrine, M. Talas writes that military doctrine in Syria is a doctrine of a peace-loving state following the path of progressive social development, a doctrine of the armed defense of the victories of the Syrian people, state interests, national sovereignty and independence of the country. It condemns the aggressive, unjust reactionary wars and approves just, liberation, revolutionary wars. The doctrine is based on the just goals of defending the national independence of the state and ensuring the development of its society along a progressive path. "We do not need the lands of others, we do not intend to wage aggressive wars to seize the territories of other states and expand our frontiers...," writes the author. "We also are on the side of the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for their national interests and for the creation of their own independent state, and are ready to give it fraternal aid in all matters" (p 255).

At the same time, as is pointed out on the pages of the book, the military doctrine of Syria provides, in the event of a war, the conduct of active, decisive operations from its very start using the entire combat might of the state and its armed forces.

In the book a special place has been given to the organizational development of the Syrian Armed Forces. It emphasizes that the turning of the army into a reliable bulwark for defending the victories of the revolution has been aided by specific measures in the area of military organizational development. At present the Syrian Armed Forces conform to their purpose and are in a high state of combat readiness. Nevertheless, at the present stage of scientific and technical progress, a number of measures must be carried out aimed at improving the organizational structure both as a whole for the armed forces as well as their individual services.

The scientific and practical value of the book is increased by the fact that it widely analyzes the experience of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, as well as the results of troop exercises and maneuvers. This experience lay at the basis of working out the most important provisions of military art in terms of the conditions of the Near East. In criticizing bourgeois military art, the author emphasizes that "...the course of the hostilities in 1973 showed that the actual use of the advanced achievements of Soviet military art made it possible for us in a short period of time during the first stages of the

war to gain superiority over the enemy and achieve a definite operational-strategic success" (p 309).

In thoroughly analyzing the factors of scientific and technical progress, the author shows not only their natural influence on strategy, operational art and tactics, but also reviews the particular features of conducting combat operations in the local wars of the Near East under present-day conditions.

In referring to the experience of the 1973 October War, M. Talas notes that this war introduced a number of new aspects into the theory and practice of military art. First of all, the war affirmed that, regardless of the power of modern weapons, combat at present still continues to remain the most important means of defeating the enemy and achieving operational and strategic objectives.

The mass use of both traditional as well as new highly effective weapons and military equipment by the sides in modern operations and the necessity of a rational combination of them require the creation of a grouping of men and equipment which would provide for a successful countering of the enemy in a complex and dynamic situation of modern combat or operation.

In bringing out the content of the basic components of military art--strategy, operational art and tactics--the author comments that under present-day conditions, success and a high breakthrough rate against prepared defenses will largely depend upon the surprise of actions and the degree of fire neutralization of the enemy.

Also worthy of note are many conclusions on the breakthrough of heavily fortified positions and zones, on the necessity of the further development of airborne troops and the broader use of helicopters on the battlefield, the growing role of the tank troops, air defense, cooperation between the various men and equipment in combined-arms combat and an operation.

In speaking about the system of combat training for the personnel of the armed forces as employed in Syria, M. Talas analyzes in detail the basic forms and methods of training and indoctrination, and on the basis of them, for the first time considering local conditions, the ways have been determined for increasing the effectiveness of the military pedagogical process.

The author views the questions of the moral-psychological training of the troops against a background of the intense nature of combat operations in the world and Arab-Israeli wars, commenting that the spiritual forces of an army and all the people of a country are of enormous significance for the course and outcome of the war. Only its just nature generates in the people and the army enormous energy, high morale, mass heroism and self-sacrifice for the sake of defending the independence and territorial integrity of the motherland.

However, firm moral-psychological conditioning, the book states, like the other military qualities essential for victory over a strong enemy, do not come about spontaneously. This is achieved by the complex of military training, ideological and military indoctrination of the personnel, and by the entire way of army life.

In the reviewed book, great attention is paid to the problem of troop control. A separate chapter is devoted to this important question, and it particularly

emphasizes that the carrying out of strategic, operational and tactical missions by the Armed Forces is inconceivable without firm, continuous, reliable and flexible control. In referring to the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the author using specific examples has shown the necessity of further improving control on any troop level on the basis of the modern achievements of science and technology, and has outlined specific ways for solving this problem.

In conclusion it must be pointed out that M. Talas has carried out extensive research, and has created a valuable and useful scientific work which will provide substantial aid to the generals and officers of the Syrian Armed Forces in carrying out the practical missions of strengthening the combat might and readiness of the troops.

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AVIATION ENGINEERING ACADEMY: 60TH ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE

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[Article by Prof, Engr-Lt Gen A. Shtoda, deputy chief of the Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy: "The 60th Anniversary of the Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy"]

[Text] One of the oldest military schools of the nation, the Order of Lenin and Order of the October Revolution, Red Banner Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy has celebrated its 60th anniversary. All its history is inseparably linked with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and to the rise and development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In 1920, during the days of celebrating the 50th anniversary of the scientific activities of the "father of Russian aviation," the prominent scientist and patriot of his motherland, Nikolay Yegorovich Zhukovskiy, the air technical school was transformed into the institute for engineers of the Red Air Force. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved the charter of the institute on 23 November 1920. Subsequently, after the renaming of the institute as the Air Force Academy imeni Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, the day of 23 November was maintained as the "day of its founding." Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy was elected rector of the institute.

The Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute has kept two documents signed by V. I. Lenin on the providing of the necessary space for the Red Air Force Engineers Academy imeni N. Ye. Zhukovskiy.[1] This is clear proof that V. I. Lenin took a personal part in creating the nation's first higher aviation school and in ensuring the conditions for its operation.

It was considered advisable to locate the institute near the airfield at Khodynskoye Field, in the former Petrov Palace, renamed the Red Aviation Palace.

In response to the concern of V. I. Lenin, the academy's collective addressed him in a letter: "We are firmly confident that the day will soon come when our red combat eagles will be equipped with technically advanced aircraft manufactured by the revolutionary proletariat from their own materials, under the leadership of their own engineers trained by the Air Force Academy.... Long live science and technology in the hands of the victorious proletariat."[2]

The first graduation of aviation engineers was held on 2 April 1925. By an order of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, 31 graduates were given the title of "military engineer-mechanic of the Air Force." In a short period of time the academy turned into one of the leading higher institutions of learning in the nation. It created good training facilities, and a highly skilled faculty was recruited which with knowledge and great enthusiasm worked on the development of the Red Air Force.

The first instructors of the academy were the students of N. Ye. Zhukovskiy, and subsequently the outstanding scientists and aviation designers A. A. Arkhangel'skiy, V. P. Vetchinkin, B. S. Stechkin, and B. N. Yur'yev. Working fruitfully in the academy were academicians I. I. Artobolevskiy, N. G. Bruyevich, B. M. Vul, N. T. Gudtsov, V. S. Kulebakin, M. A. Lavrent'yev, I. I. Mints and others. Giving lectures at it with great knowledge were the nationally known scientists D. M. Karbyshev, F. A. Tsander, S. A. Chaplygin, V. Ya. Klimov, N. I. Vorogushin, I. I. Privalov, V. V. Golubev, A. I. Nekrasov, and the Civil War hero G. D. Gay.

From 1928, the academy began to train not only engineer but also command personnel for the Air Force. This was directed by F. P. Novitskiy, A. V. Sergeyev, G. D. Khakhan'yan, A. V. Selyakov and I. T. Spirin, as well as other well known aviation specialists. On 21 February 1933, the Soviet government, having highly praised the achievements of the academy in educational and scientific research work, awarded it the highest decoration of the motherland, the Order of Lenin. In 1940, on the basis of the command, operational and navigator faculties and advanced training courses for command personnel of this military school, the Military Academy for Command and Navigator Personnel was organized (now the Air Force Academy imeni Yu. A. Gagarin).

During the years of the Great Patriotic War, the academy trained around 2,500 aviation engineers. Some 450 pilots and technicians from the operational army were returned within the walls of the academy for training on new aviation equipment. The scientists of this institution of learning carried out 551 scientific research projects. Many of them were of great practical value.

The practical activities of its graduates show the high quality of instruction in the academy both prior to the war and during its terrible years. The graduates of the VUZ successfully headed the leadership of the Air Forces, and commanded air armies and corps. These were Chief Mars Avn A. A. Vershinin and P. F. Zhigarev, Mars Avn P. A. Astakhov, G. A. Korotheyshin, S. F. Zhavoronkov, S. A. Krasovskiy, G. I. Rudenko, V. A. Sudets, P. Ya. Falaleyev, S. A. Khudyakov, and many generals.

The graduates of the engineering faculties directed the aviation engineering service on all its levels. Engr-Col Gens I. F. Petrov and A. A. Kapin were the chief Air Force engineers during the war years.

A major contribution to the common cause of victory over the enemy was made by those academy graduates who headed design bureaus and developed new models of combat aircraft and engines. A prominent place among them is held by the world-renowned general designers – S. I. Ilyushin, A. I. Mikoyan, A. S. Yakovlev, S. G. Kuznetsov, and S. A. Lumanskiy. The academy graduate P. V. Dement'yev worked during the war years as the deputy people's commissar of the aviation industry, and he subsequently was the minister of the aviation industry.

The academy's contribution to the common cause of victory over the enemy was highly regarded by the motherland. By an Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 18 August 1945, the academy was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for outstanding successes in the training of highly skilled personnel. Some 35 of its graduates have been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the Great Patriotic War, the USSR Air Force entered a new stage of its development. Soviet aviation became jet-powered and was equipped with modern military equipment, jet-propelled weapons, and advanced electronic and radio equipment. The academy was confronted with more complicated tasks. All its educational and scientific research activities were reorganized in accord with the achievements of aviation science and technology.

The main wealth of the academy lies in its faculty, including many doctors and candidates of sciences. In the academy active scientific and pedagogical activities are carried out by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences A. A. Krasovskiy, and the honored scientists and technicians of the RSFSR V. S. Pyshnov, P. T. Kolomytsev, Yu. A. Kochetkov, Yu. N. Nechayev, V. A. Protopopov, V. I. Tikhonov and A. S. Vol'mir.

The modern training facilities and the high skills of the faculty have made it possible for the academy to successfully carry out the task of engineer training for cosmonauts. Among its graduates are 14 USSR cosmonauts, including the first cosmonaut of our planet, Hero of the Soviet Union, Yu. A. Gagarin.

For great achievements in the training of aviation personnel and for high indicators in military and political training, for the 110th anniversary of the birthday of V. I. Lenin, the academy was awarded a Lenin Diploma, and on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the academy, the Order of the October Revolution, as well as orders of a number of socialist countries.

At present, as in all the military schools of the nation, the days of the academy are filled with intense labor. The command, the political section, the party, Komsomol and trade union organizations are showing constant concern for the continuous improvement in the training process and bettering scientific research.

The academy collective with great enthusiasm has greeted the decree of the June (1980) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. To mark the next 26th CPSU Congress with new successes in training-pedagogical, scientific research and political-indoctrination work is the honorable duty of each officer and general, worker and employee of the academy.

FOOTNOTES

[1]TsPA IML. Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute, folio 2, inv. 1, file 20883, sheets 7, 8.

[2]"50 let Voyenno-Vozdushnoy Inzhenernoy Ordena Lenina, Krasnoznamennoy Akademii imeni Professora N. Ye. Zhukovskogo" [50 Years of the Order of Lenin, Red Banner Air Force Engineering Academy imeni Prof N. Ye. Zhukovskiy], Moscow, Academy Publishing House, 1970, p 24.

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARMY GENERAL KUROCHKIN

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[Article by Col P. Dunayev, member of the USSR Journalists Union: "Pages of a Great Life (On the Occasion of the 80th Birthday of Gen Arm P. A. Kurochkin)"]

[Text] I was speaking with Gen Arm Pavel Alekseyevich Kurochkin in his office. On the general's desk were the galleys of the next volume of "Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voyna v Fotografiyakh i Dokumentakh" [The Great Patriotic War in Photographs and Documents] and the scenario for a 20-part documentary film on the feat of the Soviet people on the front and in the rear. Pavel Alekseyevich is the chairman of the editorial board of the first work and the main military consultant for the second.

"I happened to enter the war on the run," recalled the veteran. "On official business I was traveling from Chita to Orel. At Irkutsk a representative of the Irkutskaya party obkom hurriedly entered the compartment. 'It is war, Pavel Alekseyevich,' he said. 'Nazi Germany has attacked us. You have been ordered to leave the train and proceed to Moscow by airplane'."

At the beginning of the war, Lt Gen P. A. Kurochkin directed the combat operations of the 20th Army the troops of which at Smolensk were conducting a mobile defense and making bold counterstrikes against the enemy. However the enemy succeeded in reaching the rear of the 20th and 16th (under the command of Lt Gen M. F. Lukin) armies, and close the ring of encirclement. Fighting fiercely against the enemy, these field forces broke out of the ring and retreated with the main forces beyond the Dnepr. The commander-in-chief of the Western sector, Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko at the end of July 1941 reported to Hq SHC on the combat operations of these armies: "In assessing the actions of Kurochkin and Lukin...against strong forces attacking fiercely in the aim of encircling and destroying our troops, and in massing great aviation over the battlefield, they must be given their due as heroes."[1]

Many stages in the biography of the motherland and its army are fully reflected in the life of Pavel Alekseyevich Kurochkin. He was born on 19 November 1900 in the village of Gornevo in Smolenskaya Oblast. Pavel Kurochkin learned about work early

[1]TsAMO SSSR Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense , folio 246, inv. 12928, file 2, sheets 282-283.

in his life. At the age of 13, his father sent him to St. Petersburg. Initially he was a messenger boy in a confectionery shop, and later a worker in the steam engine repair shops. The historic events of the October days of 1917 were imprinted forever in the memory of the young man. He participated in the storming of the Winter Palace and in the battles at Pulkovo and Gatchina.

During the Civil War, Pavel Kurochkin as part of the 2d Separate Rifle Brigade fought in the north of Russia against the English and American interventionists. He was a telephone operator and messenger. After completing cavalry courses, he, now in the position of a platoon commander and then a squadron commander, participated in the battles against the White Poles on the Western Front, and later in suppressing the Antonov bands.

In 1920, he joined the party. P. A. Kurochkin devoted the peaceful prewar years to acquiring knowledge and improving it. He completed the Higher Cavalry School of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army], the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and its advanced studies program, and the Military Academy of the General Staff. He commanded a squadron and was the chief of staff of a brigade and cavalry division. In the middle of 1939, Pavel Alekseyevich was appointed the chief of staff of the II Cavalry Corps, and in the position of chief of staff of an army cavalry group participated in the liberation of the western oblast of the Ukraine. In battles against the White Finns, he was the commander of the XXVIII Rifle Corps. After this he commanded the First Army Troop Group, an army, and troops of the Transbaykal and Orel Military districts.

On 23 August 1941, P. A. Kurochkin assumed command of the Northwestern Front. Pavel Alekseyevich recalled: "I must confess that during all my long years of service in the army and participating in three wars, I never encountered such difficult topographical conditions as here in the Northwest. At that time we used to joke: 'We are sent to the Northwest for disobeying our parents.' A person who has spent time in those places knows these infinite, magnificent forests, the endless swamps and bogs, the enormous lakes and the villages scattered and lost in the dense forests. There are very few roads and sectors suitable for the actions of large masses of troops."

And on 7 January 1942, the Northwestern Front in the area of Demyansk went over to the offensive and by 8 February had encircled six enemy divisions (around 95,000 men).

From 18 November 1942, P. A. Kurochkin in sequence commanded the 11th and 34th armies, and on 23 June 1943 he again assumed command of the Northwestern Front, and after the breaking up of it was appointed to the position of first deputy commander of the First Ukrainian Front. From 24 February 1944, he was the commander of the Second Belorussian Front, and from 15 April of the same year until the end of the war, the commander of the 60th Army.

Whatever position Pavel Alekseyevich Kurochkin held, he always set an example of courage, tenacity, and the ability to apply advanced experience of Soviet military art on the battlefield, and by his personal example inspired his subordinates to successfully carry out the combat missions. This was the case, for example, during the L'vov-Sandomir Operation (13 July-29 August 1944). When the 322d Rifle Division of Maj Gen P. N. Lashchenko succeeded by the end of 15 July 1944 of driving

into the second enemy defensive zone and forming a breach to the south of Koltov, subsequently called the Koltov Corridor, the commander of the 60th Army immediately moved his forward command post there. Here he came under not only artillery and mortar firing, but also machine gun.

"In the given instance it was primarily a question of carrying out a mission on which enormous human effort and materials had been expended. Business first," repeated the general, "and then a feeling of self-preservation. Of course it would have been simple to select another place for the forward command post, but when the soldiers and officers saw that the army commander, the generals and the staff officers of the army were nearby, the feeling of responsibility, the moral state and spirit of the troops became higher."

Aside from the L'vov-Sandomir Operation, Gen P. A. Kurochkin took an active part and directed the troops in such major operations as the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy (24 January-17 February 1944), Vistula-Oder (12 January-3 February 1945), and Morava-Ostrava (10 March-5 May 1945). The last operation in which he participated was the Prague (6-11 May 1945) carried out for the purpose of providing aid to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia. For able leadership of the troops and for personal courage, Col Gen P. A. Kurochkin was given the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war Pavel Alekseyevich served in command positions in the troops. In May 1954, he was appointed the chief of the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze where he carried out extensive organizational and educational work. Under the leadership of Gen Army P. A. Kurochkin, the scientific collective of the academy has worked out a number of major works on the theory of combined-arms combat. In 1962, for great scientific and pedagogical activities he was given the academic title of professor, and subsequently awarded the Prize imeni M. V. Frunze, and for participating in the creation of the movie epoch "The Great Patriotic War," the Lenin Prize.

From September 1970, P. A. Kurochkin has been the military inspector-advisor for the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Communist Kurochkin has been a delegate to a number of CPSU congresses, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, and a member of the CPSU Leninskiy Raykom of Moscow. He has been awarded four Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, four orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov First Degree, two orders of Kutuzov First Degree, the orders Honor Badge and for Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces Third Degree, and many medals. Pavel Alekseyevich also has a number of orders and medals from the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

To the question "What would you wish the youth?" the famous military leader replied:

"Wholehearted service to the fatherland! People are often given various high titles. But the most honorable is a defender of the motherland. For this reason

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[1]The rank of colonel general was awarded to P. A. Kurochkin on 28 August 1943, and army general on 9 May 1959.

their mission is to protect and reliably defend what has been won by the Soviet people."

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON ARMY GENERAL SHCHELOKOV

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, Nov 80 signed to press 28 Oct 80 pp 94-96

[Article by Col Gen K. Grushevoy: "Gen Army N. A. Shchelokov (On the Occasion of His 70th Birthday")

[text] Gen Army Nikolay Anisimovich Shchelokov is a Soviet state figure, a member of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Doctor of Economic Sciences. He was born on 26 November 1910 in the settlement of Almaznaya, Luganskaya (now Voroshilovgradskaya) Oblast in a metallurgical worker's family. He began his labor career at the age of 16 at the Mine imeni Il'ich in Kadiyevka (now Stakhanov). In 1929-1935 he studied at the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute.

In 1934-1935, Nikolay Anisimovich was on active military service in a team of one-year servicemen of the 135th Artillery Regiment of the High Command Reserve. Prior to service in the army (in 1933) and after it until 1938, in Almaznaya and Dnepropetrovsk he was a duty engineer, a deputy chief and chief of the blast-furnace shop.

The people of Dnepropetrovsk also know N. A. Shchelokov as the first secretary of the Krasnogvardeyskiy Raykom (1938-1939) and the chairman of the city soviet (1939-1941). These were years of intense labor in responsible positions in the party and soviet apparatus, and fruitful activity directed at carrying out the tasks posed by the party in strengthening the economic and defense might of the motherland.

To talk about N. A. Shchelokov means to recall the first five-year plans and the titanic labor of the Soviet people invested in the factories and plants, the mines, into the defense of the motherland, and to remember the fiery years of the Great Patriotic War and the reconstruction of the national economy which had been destroyed by the fascist occupiers, a time aptly called by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, L. I. Brezhnev, the years of rebirth.

A Komsomol member from the 1920's and a communist from 1931, N. A. Shchelokov was always a principled and ardent propagandist of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and showed himself to be a talented organizer with potential as a scientist. It was not accidental that in 1937, upon the order of the USSR People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, at the blast furnace of the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Equipment Plant experimental melts were organized using an oxygen blast, the young metallurgical engineer N. A. Shchelokov was appointed their chief.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War found N. A. Shchelokov in the position of chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk City Soviet. With his inherent energy he immediately became involved in reorganizing the entire life of the city to a wartime footing, mobilizing the human and material resources, forming new units and formations, and organizing the output of military products by the city's enterprises. And he made a major contribution to this noble cause.

Under his direct leadership as the chief of local air defense for Dnepropetrovsk, in a short period of time thousands of city workers were mobilized to build bomb shelters, eliminate the consequences of enemy bombings, to extinguish fires, provide help to victims, maintain the viability of the city economy and enterprises, and build defensive works.

Nikolay Anisimovich started the war as a senior political instructor. He was the representative of the military council of the Southern Front for Stalingradskaya and Rostovskaya oblasts, the chief of the operations group of the 24th Army, the military commissar and deputy chief for political affairs for the rear of the Northern Troop Group of the Transcaucasian Front and later the Northern Caucasus Front.

During those difficult times under the conditions of an acute shortage of transport and personnel in the rear services, I repeatedly was to witness how due to the great organizational capabilities of N. A. Shcheloko the formations were supplied with ammunition, fuel, food and everything essential for combat.

After the liberation of the Caucasus from the Nazis, Col N. A. Shcheloko was appointed deputy commander for political affairs and chief of the political section of the 218th Romodano-Kiev Order of Lenin, Red Banner, Order of Suvorov Rifle Division. As part of it he fought in Belorussia, he liberated Volyn and fraternal Poland. His further military record was linked to the XXVIII L'vov Rifle Corps, where N. A. Shcheloko was deputy commander for political affairs and chief of the political section. During the combat operations of the corps he was often in the battle formations, and together with the men, the commanders and political workers he repeatedly drove off enemy infantry and tank attacks, he was among the first to cross the Western Bug, Vistula and Oder.... He ended the war in Prague.

"A true political worker in the army," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is the person around whom the men are grouped, he thoroughly knows their moods, needs, hopes and dreams, and leads them to self-sacrifice, to a feat. And if it is considered that troop morale has always been recognized as the most important factor in the strength of the troops, then the political worker was entrusted with the strongest weapon in the war years. He tempered the souls and hearts of the men, and without which neither the tanks, the cannons nor the aircraft would have brought us victory."[1]

These words apply completely to Gen Mjr N. A. Shcheloko. He trod the roads of the war along with many prominent military leaders and political workers of the Soviet Armed Forces. Nikolay Anisimovich imbibed everything that these people were rich

[1] L. I. Brezhnev, "Malaya zemlya" Litiz zarisi, Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, p. 24.

in, and learned from them military art and the ability to inspire hearts with the passionate word of the communist and lead them to victory over the enemy.

In September 1945-July 1946, N. A. Shchelokov was secretary of the party commission in the Carpathian Military District, and in August, upon discharge into the reserves, became the Ukrainian deputy minister of local industry. During those difficult times the towns and villages of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldavia, Belorussia, the Ukraine and part of the RSFSR lay in ruins and many plants and factories stood idle. The traditional paths for material supply of the population had been disrupted. Local industry assumed important significance. N. A. Shchelokov, in using his very rich experience acquired during the prewar and war years, threw himself into the work and, it must be said, did a great deal. However, soon thereafter he had to carry out more difficult and responsible tasks. From 1947 through 1951, N. A. Shchelokov worked in the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. During these years he made a significant contribution to rebuilding and developing republic industry.

From 1951, N. A. Shchelokov was in sequence the first deputy chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers and the chairman of the Moldavian Sovnarkhoz Council of the National Economy. In 1956, Nikolay Antsimovich was elected the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Communist Party. In September 1960, he was appointed USSR Minister of Internal Affairs.

N. A. Shchelokov was a delegate to the 23d, 24th and 25th CPSU congresses. In 1966, he was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. From 1968, he was a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He was also a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 4th-10th sittings.

For great accomplishments for the Communist Party and the Soviet government, Nikolay Antsimovich Shchelokov has been awarded three orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, two orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitskiy Second Degree, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the Labor Red Banner, the Red Star, and many medals. For the development of friendship and cooperation, he has received orders and medals from the fraternal socialist countries.

The USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen Army N. A. Shchelokov, is carrying out diverse and fruitful work in organizing the execution of the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government in the area of strengthening legality and law and order, improving the activities of the internal affairs bodies and the Interior Troops, and strengthening the interaction of them with the labor collectives and the other social organizations for the purposes of ensuring exemplary public order.

[Original] ("Sovetsko-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1981)

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POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION: COMMANDER TRANSCAUCASUS MD

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Aug 80 pp 2-3

[Article by Col Gen O. Kulishev, commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "A School of Patriotism, Collectivism and Citizenship"]

[Text] Party business frequently takes me to various labor collectives in the republic, where I talk with the people. Each time I hear words of praise about our former soldiers, now outstanding production workers, I get a feeling of special pride for our army. Such men are Nodari Loganashvili, a foreman at the head enterprise of the "Mikrodvigatel'" association, Zaur Gvelesiani, an engineer at the Electric-Welding Equipment Plant imeni Paton in Tbilisi, Teymuraz Gomelauri, assemblyman fitter at the "Mikrodvigatel'" plant, David Nozadze, fitter at the Machine-Tool Plant imeni Kirov, and many others.

Military service has left a profound impression in the awareness of these young people, visibly reflected in their character, habits and conduct. This is additional, clear confirmation of the statement made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 25th party congress: "The youth arrive in the family of soldiers," he said, "lacking the schooling of life. However, they return from the army as individuals schooled in persistence and discipline, with technical and professional expertise and political training."

Right now, as we make preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress, we return again and again to the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Army. Article 31 of the Constitution of the USSR states: "The Armed Forces of the USSR were created and compulsory military duty was established for the purpose of protecting the socialist conquests, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state." It is this great mission of the Soviet Army and Navy and their historic destiny, which constitute the main factor permitting the Armed Forces of the USSR successfully to develop in the youth the traits and qualities not only of the fighting man but also of the citizen, the worker, the builder of the new society.

Furthermore, the entire military service, its entire rigid structure and the intensive combat training process--drills, classes and exercises, flight and cruises, combat watch, the servicing and employment of the latest equipment and weapons instill in the individual good morale, fighting efficiency and moral qualities.

been launched on an extensive scale in the [illegible] for the right to bear the title Hero of the Soviet Union and to have one's name entered in perpetuity on the rosters of district units. The indoctrinational work makes extensive use of a [illegible] depicting the battle at Malaya Zemlya, which was created for the new Museum of the History of District Forces now under construction.

We shall continue to closely coordinate all this work involved in the patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of the fighting men with the central committees of the communist parties of the Transcaucasus republics, with local party and soviet organs. We see our task as one of continuing to develop sponsorship relations, actively drawing upon Armed Forces veterans for the heroic and patriotic indoctrination, and enhancing the forms and methods used in the work of military museums and the combat glory rooms and Lenin rooms of the subunits.

We consider one of the most important objectives of ideological work in the army to be that of making every fighting man thoroughly cognizant of the party's conclusions relative to the present distribution of political and military forces in the world and of the danger contained in the aggressive nature of the present course being pursued by certain groups in the United States, especially in the Near and Middle East, and in the hegemonistic policy of the Beijing leaders.

Ideological conditioning and good political awareness in the fighting men motivate them to perform their military work selflessly, to master the weapons and combat equipment as rapidly as possible, to master their combat specialties and to perform their military duty irreproachably. In classes conducted in the field, in the mountains at ranges and tank training grounds and in exercises the personnel are acquiring the qualities essential for defeating the enemy: courage, valor, steadfastness, persistence in achieving the goal and the ability to stand prolonged physical and psychological stress. These qualities are possessed by combat engineers Senior Lieutenant Sergey Plyakin, Private First Class Daynis Masbergs and Junior Sergeant Andrey Kril', who very recently defused a large quantity of enemy ammunition. It was for these qualities that Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Moskalenko, deputy USSR Minister of Defense, praised grenade throwers Privates N. Aliyev and M. Minosyan, tankmen Sergeants I. Iazimov and Yu. Mel'nik, Private S. Mishin and many other soldiers at the most recent exercises.

In the service a fighting man masters a skill, which then frequently becomes his lifetime occupation. One study, for example, has shown that 44 percent of the fighting men discharged into the reserve use the special training acquired in the army at their jobs in the national economy. The army is thereby making an important contribution directly to the creation of the materials and equipment base for communism.

All of army life, including the routine military workdays, are a factor in the moral indoctrination of the fighting men. Strict order and discipline in the performance of duties, the ability to carry out an order absolutely, accurately and within the time specified, under any circumstances--this tradition-imbued requirement becomes a habit of the fighting man, a conviction, a personality trait. The sense of responsibility, the discipline and organization which develop in a youth during

his time in the military service remain with him throughout his life. When we see a sharp, efficient individual, we always suspect that this is a former serviceman.

Military service also develops in the young people such important qualities as collectivism, a sense of great responsibility to a comrade and a willingness consciously to subordinate their own personal interests to those of the society. Today, when we speak of morality, I recall Farkhad Teymurov, a 19-year-old military construction worker, who was on leave when he dashed into a burning house and rescued eight people. He lost his life in the process. And does the feat performed by Private First Class Nabi Chamsadinov, who arrested a dangerous criminal and was awarded the Komsomol Badge of Honor for the deed, not indicate great civic responsibility and intolerance of antisocial acts and occurrences?

The task of increasing the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces depends to a certain degree upon the work of those in charge, the officers, party and Komsomol organizations. The commander has an enormous range of duties, and rigid standards are used for measuring his sense of personal responsibility, primarily for the level of combat readiness of the personnel. In time of war the commander leads the fighting men into battle and on behalf of the homeland takes charge of the lives of the men under him. This is why our party demands that the officers possess good moral-political qualities and set a good personal example at all times and in all things.

...In the course of exercises the "enemy" flame-throwers discharged a stream of fire. A bridge erected over a canyon caught fire. There was no other way to cross, however. The speed of the attack made it necessary to dash over this bridge and up a burning ladder, to leap across the flame shooting out a pit, put on protective equipment and move on. Many of the fighting men looked at this "burning" road with apprehension. The attack could fail. Officers A. Lesin and A. Gagloyev ran onto the bridge ahead of the others. Sergeants O. Matiashvili and E. Gavdarov, Privates I. Solon'ko, K. Cherevkhanov and Yu. Yusupov, and the other soldiers followed them confidently across the moral-psychological strip. Once again the personal example set by the commander was the crucial factor.

We know full well that it will be impossible to further increase the indoctrinational role of military service without improving the work of party organizations. To be the center of ideological and moral indoctrination--this is the combat task which the party has assigned its organizations. And the better our party organizations perform this task, the more perceptible will be their assistance to commanders and the more marked will be the spirit of party-mindedness permeate the entire life of the collective. It is perfectly clear that this will also increase the role of Komsomol organizations in the indoctrination of the young fighting men. Naturally, we do not start from scratch to develop ideological and moral qualities in the servicemen. The youth entering the Armed Forces possess certain social qualities and personality traits developed in the family, at school and on their jobs in production, under the influence of the total socialist way of life, in the process of the ideological, political and indoctrinational work performed by the party. The republic cities of Poti and

Rustavi and Takhaltubo, Makharadzevskiy, Kobuletskiy and Marneul'skiy rayons, as well as Leninskiy Rayon in the city of Tbilisi and many others, have accumulated worthwhile experience in the performance of this work. The joint efforts of local party and soviet organs, Komsomol and DOSAAF organizations, military commissariats, initial military training departments of the Ministry of Education and the State Committee for Technical and Vocational Training, as well as the district's commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations to provide the youth with military-patriotic indoctrination are producing good results and helping to further the preparation of the youth for service in the army.

At the same time, one sometimes hears the young soldiers talk about the fact that being drafted for two years into the army, so they say, forced them to postpone their plans for the future, that it prevented them from entering an institute upon graduating from school, and so forth, for example. Such regrets are unwarranted, however. The military service develops the individual, forms his convictions, and accustoms the youth to industry, honor and decency in the broadest sense of the term. And these are the qualities which make it possible for the young person to realize his dreams, to achieve the goal he has set for himself.

The individual spends a relatively short period of time on active military duty. This time has invaluable effects, however. By indoctrinating new generations of Soviet fighting men, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev states, the army "is preparing for the homeland people morally and physically strong and courageous, with firm communist convictions and a good awareness of their public duty. And these qualities are needed not only by the serviceman but also by the citizen of our country. Those schooled in the military service can be counted upon both in the creative civilian work and, if it comes to that, at an hour of military trial."

[illegible] great praise of the indoctrinational role of military service by the party means that all of us during this period of preparations for the 26th CPSU Congress must work even better, perform with even better effectiveness and quality the tasks assigned for improving the combat readiness of the troops, and seek new ways to make fuller use of military service for preparing ideologically strong and stable cadres for the country's national economy.

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